



Evaluation process for the Commission tobacco prevention media campaign

Processus d'évaluation de la campagne de
prévention du tabagisme de la Commission



Evaluation Report Rapport d'évaluation

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Object of the evaluation

The evaluation to date covers the first year of the campaign, 2002 ; this is the reason why mainly the TV spots with footballers and pop stars were evaluated.

The evaluation consists of a review of “the logical framework of the campaign and the original objectives¹”, an analysis of the effectiveness of the campaign “in reaching young people between the ages of 12 and 18, in ensuring that the message is fully understood and is affecting their attitudes and smoking behaviour”, as well as an assessment of “the role of all contributors to the campaign”.

Method

The evaluation is mainly qualitative².

Different methods were used, such as literature review ; analysis of audience figures ; focus groups in each of the 15 Member States, with 13-14 years old teenagers, and during which the youth expressed their typical portraits of smokers and non-smokers, by picture "collages" on posters ; consultations of National Focal Points, experts, and institutions ; as well as expert workshops.

Main Findings

The teenagers participating in the focus groups appreciated the easy-going and not moralising style of the campaign. The anti-tobacco objective of the campaign was understood; even if most elements of the campaign, taken separately, did not refer clearly to tobacco, including the claim "Feel Free to Say No".

As expressed in the "collages", the image of smokers appeared quite seducing to adolescents: independent-minded people, questioning laws and morals, self-confident, experienced with sexuality or experiencing it, living in a tough world, members of a peer group. On the other hand, nonsmokers were described as good girls/boys, conforming to adult authority, innocent and naive, “non-initiated”, but active and responsible people who play sport, eat a healthy diet and enjoy nature.

After looking at the TV ads, the image of the non-smokers remained unchanged. Professional footballers were seen as “compulsory” non-smokers, and the fact that pop stars do not smoke was not judged credible by some. “Manipulation” was suspected by some groups; others believed the ad was targeted at children. Moreover, what was shown on the screen seemed unrelated to real life. Few positive reasons were provided for not smoking, except “be cool”, while negative messages (“no no no...”) were omnipresent.

¹ Quotations from the terms of reference of this evaluation.

² Because the budget of the campaign, per targeted person (around 20 eurocents) did not enable the campaign to have a quantitatively measurable impact.



The theme of “freedom” was highly relevant to the teenagers. However, rather than freedom from peers (“saying no” to them), the challenge they face is to become autonomous adults, free from the influence of parents as well as free from any addiction.

Recommendations

In general, there is doubt as to whether added value at European level is optimised by launching direct media campaigns at the young public, because if they are to be effective at micro-social level (the level where the youth is influenced to smoke or not), not only would a much larger budget be required, but also a fine-tuned social marketing approach that is specifically oriented on cultures and languages. Regarding the long-term design of communication actions on tobacco control by the Commissions, prospective hints are provided in the report to tackle these issues.

Recommendations are proposed for the next year of the media campaign, including:

- More language and national adaptation, which necessitates intensive pretesting, involving the Panel of Experts as well as the targeted public;
- More extensive use of existing knowledge and handbooks, including Canadian and American ones;
- Dealing with the “freedom” theme in more depth, in connection with the risk of becoming addicted;
- Showing real life situations³ and practical ways to avoid smoking or becoming addicted.

Two evaluation patterns could be meaningful for the next, global evaluation of the campaign. A raw design is proposed for a quantitative survey, relevant if the Commission and the experts consider this kind of evaluation as cost-effective.

³ The 2003 press campaign, though not evaluated, appears to be a move in this direction.



1. CONTENT

This report presents the findings of the Evalua team regarding the Commission's anti-smoking prevention campaign "Feel Free to Say No."

This evaluation draws upon the following sources of information:

- **The analysis of the campaign's logical framework**, based upon a literature review, see part 4 below;
- **Re-analysis of audience data** collected by Media Consulta - part 5;
- **Qualitative research with youth in the 15 EU countries**, part 6;
- **Review of the situation at the national and partnership levels**, with more than 20 interviews with key informants in the countries, part 7;
- Exchanges with the **expert panel** and the national focal points (NFPs), at meetings in Luxembourg and via an e-mail discussion list - also used in part 7.

The methodological approach is described in a progress report of 28 March 2003, entitled "Research design" or "Protocole d'évaluation". Some key provisions are described in the relevant sections of this report, esp. for the qualitative research.

This final report includes the following components:


- An **evaluative synthesis**: part 2;
- A specific development of the **recommendations**: part 3;
- A presentation of the evaluation findings by kind and topic: parts 4 to 7.

2. EVALUATIVE SYNTHESIS

2.1 The campaign logic and design are self-coherent and consistent with the literature

2.1.1 Consistence with the general framework of media campaigns

Consistently with the logic of a media campaign, the campaign was expected to get impact through the following mechanism:



This mechanism can be broken down into 4 steps:

1. Targeting of 12-18 years old adolescents.
2. (a) Effective *reach* of the message by the target group, (b) *repetition* of the message to this target, and thus resulting in (c) *awareness*: the campaign has been noticed by youth.
3. Reactions (preferably favourable) to this message, taking into account its interactions with previous attitudes, individual or collective, as well as with messages from other institutions and from the tobacco companies;
4. (a) Improvement of attitudes regarding non smokers, non smoking, and (b) reduction of intentions to smoke.

The evaluation encompasses steps 1 to 4, taking into account that change at stage 4a/4b is required indeed to provide an actual reduction in tobacco use. The primary data collected specifically by the evaluators refers only to stages 3 and 4.

- ✓ TV a "powerful" media, i.e., almost everyone looks at TV at least from time to time - whereas radio listening behaviours, as well as press reading ones, strongly depend on the country or social group. The allocation of most of the media budget to TV was therefore consistent with the idea of targeting the whole of the European youth with a pan-European message, rather than targeting differently specific national, professional or social groups.
- ✓ The analysis of the evaluation data confirmed the logic of the above mechanism, the literature suggests to refine stage 4b. The intentions to smoke decrease (or the intentions not to smoke increase) appears to be the most important factor in predicting actual behaviour change: influencing this level (behavioural intentions) should therefore be targeted, rather than general opinions or images⁴.

2.1.2 Consistence with the literature regarding the efficiency of tobacco prevention media campaigns

- ✓ There is much rationale, supported by the literature, for the choice, made by the Commission, of the teenagers target (12 to 18 years old) for a tobacco prevention action.
- ✓ The design of the campaign by MC complies with most of the key success factors of success of primary tobacco prevention media campaigns, as assessed by the literature ; but the degree of compliance is limited by the financial and institutional framework of the campaign:

<i>Some key success factors in the campaign design, according to the literature</i>	<i>Degree of compliance</i>
High levels of prolonged exposure	The budget does not afford it (around 20 cents per European teenager). But MC took steps in this direction, by a lasting slogan and logo (idea of a "non-smoking brand"), a permanent website, etc.
Target behaviours rather than (poorly unrelated) knowledge/attitudes	A behaviour is put forward ("say no") rather than knowledge.
Build upon a good research with young people	MC's bid uses prior researches. But the 1st flight, launched in emergency conditions, has not been tested ; the 2nd one, surprisingly, neither; the test of the slogan by ICON is superficial (no new ideas produced since the initial bid).
The message must be credible and relevant to the young people themselves	The simplicity of the message and the use of stars as spokespeople, were intended to achieve this aim.
Focus on short vs. long-term impacts of smoking (or non-smoking) and offer ways to avoid the risks	The great majority of the message is focused on immediate behaviours and feelings - but the benefits and ways not to smoke are not obvious in these messages.

⁴ See our analysis of the logical framework, ref. R3026F, page 9, and R3042F, page 10.

Build upon peer influence	Stars are intended to feature role models.
Show how smoking can result in social disapproval (non-smoking = approval)	The campaign shows the disapproval of smoking by popular characters. But the social dimension of (non-) smoking is not visible.
Aim de-normalisation of smoking (culture change).	Presenting pop stars who disapprove smoking, intends to dismiss the wrong idea that "everybody smokes" at least in some (valued) social groups.
Integrate the campaign into a comprehensive tobacco control strategy (for example, the campaign may help to set the public agenda).	MC's bid intends to combine TV ads with bottom-up action at the grassroots level. Some PR actions have been fulfilled, none of them "bottom-up". Nevertheless, they were intended to publicize the broader tobacco control intentions of the Commission, and thus to influence national decision makers in charge of public health.

2.2 Targeting the 12-18 year olds was consistently achieved, but TV media does not provide for very specific targeting

- ✓ The campaign achieved defining a coherent target for media planning, the design of messages, and all other activities: the adolescents target (12-18 years old), as initially specified by the Commission.
- ✓ The bid from Media Consulta took into account the intrinsic diversity of this target, e.g. differences in gender, age, social standing, country...
- ✓ TV is an unspecific media (compared to press for example) - a spot targeted on one specific group of population will also be seen by very different kinds of people. For this reason:

The choice of media (TV) did not permit to sub-segment the target group in the mediaplanning. In some countries, TV mediaplanning could not even address this age specifically, and thus a broader age group had to be addressed: 8-19 years in Italy, 15-24 years in Portugal ...

The choice of media (TV) did not permit to sub-segment the target in the content of the message. However, the contents of the two spots can be seen as targeting specifically the boys (the "Footballers" spot) vs. the girls (the "Pop stars" spot).

- ✓ The 2002 campaign aimed to prevent the initiation of smoking behaviours, rather than promote cessation or prevent time-to-time smokers to become addicted. Consistently, according to the evaluators' analysis of the content of the messages, they targeted rather the 12-14 years olds, than the 15-18.

2.3 Exposure of this target to the campaign (reach, frequency, awareness): media planning choices were reasonable, but the budget was not sufficient to provide for lasting awareness beyond a small percentage of the target

- ✓ Among the people in the target, the proportion reached by at least one spot on national TV channels varies from 26 to 75% according to figures collected by MC, not including the youth who would have been reached *only* by Pan-European television such as MTV and Eurosport.
- ✓ The average number of contacts per target person, through national televisions, is about 2.0 for both spots, according to our estimates (that is 1.0 on average for each spot). This level of exposure generally is regarded as insufficient to provide for awareness (3 exposures for the same spot are generally considered as the minimum).
- ✓ A higher number of contacts was reached through MTV (2.0) and Eurosport (0.6): about 2.6 per young European according to our estimates. Only a portion of youth have access to these channels, varying from one country to another; therefore, the number of spots to which each teenager of a subscriber household was exposed, is largely higher than 2.6 or 3 and thus could lead to awareness of the content of the message.
- ✓ The average cost of broadcasting on MTV, thanks to a partnership with this channel, was three times lower than that on the other channels (taking into account all types of contacts). This choice, recommended by MC from the beginning, is thus specially efficient.
- ✓ Use of national television is therefore less efficient; using these channels was compulsory, due to the Commission's terms of references, which required a homogeneous distribution of the media budget among countries. This homogeneous distribution was respected, taken apart the Netherlands, where the 2nd wave was not broadcasted due to objections from the national partner in that country, and taken apart countries where discounts or free advertising (Greece) were provided.
- ✓ A post-test survey would have been necessary in order to measure awareness. Although MC's proposal mentioned this possibility, it was not budgeted between MC and the Commission, and was not implemented by MC.
- ✓ A post-test has however been carried out in Sweden (because its cost was included in the media budget): while carried out professionally, it was concise and not specific. It suggests that short-term awareness of the campaign (just after the campaign) may have been about 20% among the target group, a level that does not allow for significant medium-term awareness..
- ✓ Spontaneous mention of the campaign by a few of the participants in the focus groups suggest that - 8 months and a year after the two flights of the campaign - awareness is not zero ... but is, country by country, considerably lower than the awareness of national campaigns, of cigarette advertising (of course!), or of advertising of substitute products.

- ✓ These very modest reach results are consistent with the campaign's budget, a very modest one in comparison with national campaigns on the same topic. This very limited budget suggests to evaluate the campaign as a pilot action: questions of awareness or impact would only make sense if the budget would permit exposure on a much broader scale.
 - As a pilot action, the success or the failure of the campaign can only be considered in terms of its qualitative value (questions 3 to 5: Sect. 2.3-2.5) and with regard to its possible catalytic effect on others (e.g. governments and organisations) action. From this perspective, the start of the campaign can be a "springboard", a basis for greater impact of the campaign in the following years.

2.4 Youth reactions to the message: the campaign's tone appeals to them, but they notice its lack of content

In a preliminary analysis of the content of the campaign, the evaluators estimated that it would be more appropriate for the 12-14 year age group (even the 10-14 year olds) rather than for the 15-18 one. This assumes that the reactions of the 15-18 years old are likely to be less favourable, and that there is less likelihood of any change in their attitudes or intentions regarding smoking.

What follows concerns only the 12-14 year old boys and girls of the 15 EU Member States.

- ✓ Participating stars faces help to attract attention to the campaign. The 12-14 year old youth in each country recognise several of these faces and, the collective viewing of the spots can turn into a game of "who is who?", even if several stars are not recognised (popularity of stars is not always Europe-wide).
- ✓ These stars are generally popular and liked by the teenagers in the focus groups. Even though the target audience of most of the pop stars used in the campaign is younger (8-11 years) - an age gap that was highlighted by teenagers in the groups.
- ✓ The soundtrack as a whole is liked, except the "choir" part of the "pop stars" spot which is considered too childish. However, the soundtrack does not seem able to attract attention by itself.
- ✓ The fact that the spot is against tobacco, is understood. However, the link between tobacco and this campaign, although clear in the "pop-stars" soundtrack or in the crossed cigarettes of the logo, is not constant: neither the soundtrack of the "footballers" spot, the "Feel Free to Say No" slogan, the colours of the logo, nor the pictures of the spots, explicitly refer to tobacco or to a benefit arising from not smoking. Thus, the attempt of MC to create a "non-smoking brand", vis-à-vis tobacco brands, has not yet taken hold.
- ✓ The correct understanding of the message has been facilitated, in the focus groups, by the possibility to watch the whole spot carefully. In actual viewing conditions, this understanding is not likely to be so accurate, especially with respect to the "footballer" spot, because one must be thoroughly look at it, in order to understand the message.

- ✓ Understanding is also reduced by the use of the English language. This particularly applies to the Latin countries (not Greece) but also to others ones, for example the German group. The most complex messages (!), such as "Don't be fooled", were not understood by these groups. At the age of 13, many of these young people are only starting to learn English.
- ✓ The fact that stars say no to tobacco, and perhaps do not smoke themselves, constitutes a message that improves the status of non-smokers. It indeed challenges the identification of cigarettes as a way to grow up, as young adults attribute. However, this positive effect on the image of the non-smokers is undermined by the lack of identification of the youth with these stars, and by the lack of credibility of the message.
- ✓ The lack of identification particularly applies to footballers: youth say that, as high-level professional athletes, they are compelled not to smoke; while themselves, practicing sport, may easily smoke a cigarette in the locker room.
- ✓ The lack of credibility particularly applies to pop stars. Many of the youth in the focus groups suspect them of having a professional interest in featuring in the spot, of being paid for their participation, and/or of smoking. However, the "pop-stars" spot generally seems to work better not only among girls but also among boys, because the pop stars appear to be more ordinary people (than footballers). Credibility of stars concerns may represent defence mechanisms, at least in part: the idea that some popstars do not smoke is indeed unexpected for some of the youth.
 - There are strong variations among the youth in different countries regarding the principle of using stars to bring an anti-tobacco message: e.g. acceptance in the Portuguese and German groups, rejection in the British, Danish or Dutch groups...
- ✓ It is not always clear that the spots are presenting football stars and pop stars, as, in each country, some of these faces are unknown. Some youth thought that the popstar faces represented those of ordinary people; one participant interpreted a footballer's face of a rapper's one. Attempts to identify the actual faces also tend to detract attention from the underlying message of the spots.
- ✓ Youth in the groups, however, do not reject the message, and its light, funny tone avoids creating the resistance that a moralising message normally would create among adolescents. This is particularly remarkable as the text itself is quite moralising (i.e. many mentions of NOs as well as imperatives such as "don't smoke"). However, as the tone is "light", the reception of the message may also be. And the message is also not funny enough to be interesting as entertainment: groups participants rarely demonstrated any emotional reactions during the viewing of the spots.
- ✓ The spots last only 20 seconds, which was said too short⁵ by the youth. They say that there should be more information, as well as personal stories, which do not seem to fit with this format.

⁵ MC chose this 20 seconds duration, instead of the common 30 seconds standard, in order to increase the number of broadcasts given the limited media budget of the campaign.

2.5 Improvement of the non-smoker's image, and reduction of smoking intentions: low impact to be expected from these messages

The youth in the focus groups strongly indicate that these spots would not dissuade anybody from smoking - or, if anyone, very young people (8-9 years old...). This indication must however be cautiously considered, as it could also express a defence mechanism. The question is, to what extent and by which means can the campaign (or cannot) reinforce the image of the non-smoker and the intentions not to smoke.

2.5.1 The campaign and the non smoker's image

- ✓ The "collages" exercise was carried out to help the youth to express their representations of smokers and non-smokers: the non-smoker portrait appears quite flat - more infantile, more obedient, more asexual. The only positive aspects are a more responsible mentality and a more natural personality. The strategy announced by MC - "an image campaign for non-smokers" and for non-smoking - looks therefore as relevant, in order to change social representations.
- ✓ The succession of football players and pop stars saying "no" to tobacco does not really succeed in enhancing the image of the non-smoker. These personalities, specially the football players, are too far from the youth to allow identification. Furthermore, participants in public interest campaigns are already seen as "responsible" or even "natural" people - characteristics already attributed to non-smokers. In contrast, the youth refer to famous singers who are expected to smoke and to take drugs - Eminem, Marilyn Manson..., challenging the idea non-smokers are "true" pop stars.
 - The *press* campaign for 2003, by introducing "real" adolescents that MC proposes to present again in the future campaign, may overcome these factors that challenge the success potential of the TV campaign,.

2.5.2 The campaign and non-smoking intentions

- ✓ The topic of freedom (feeling "free") is very relevant for adolescents, who are seeking more freedom and independence. The message is however less striking in English-speaking countries, where "feel free to..." is received more as an expression of courtesy, than as a call for freedom.
- ✓ The link between "Feel free to say no", that had been criticised by some stakeholders at the launch of the campaign, is also problematic for some youth:
 - Some of the youth have noticed that this "prescribed freedom" to say no, is not real freedom, as real freedom would imply also freedom to smoke. The message thus can be perceived as unilateral and militant (and not as setting free), especially in North European countries (Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland). Some groups of girls, especially in Great Britain and in France, thought it could possibly reinforce smoking behaviour.

- “Feel Free to Say No” refers to a free choice to be made whether to smoke or not to smoke *before* smoking (or not). In the youth's mind, the association between freedom and not smoking comes *later*, it is related to the risk of becoming addicted and, therefore, not free anymore. In some not-English speaking countries, some youth viewing the ad have spontaneously "corrected", hearing: “Feel Free: Say No”.
- ✓ For these youth around 13, smoking is almost exclusively the result of peer pressure (especially for boys) or pressure from older people (especially for girls). In most countries, most of the youth at this age have never purchased any pack of cigarettes. Smoking for these youth is not a consumer behaviour, linking the person to a brand and a merchant, but an acceptance behaviour: accepting the values conveyed by the peer groups or the elders. Later on, stop smoking is an affirmation of personality and can boost one's prestige inside the peer group: as it proves that one has found a personal reason to act differently from the group.

In this initiation process, freedom is not directly at stake. By entering the smoking world, the young people attempt to quit the status of children, subordinates to their parents (smokers or not). Thus, they gain freedom, especially as their time-to-time consumption of tobacco is too low to make them *physically* addicted.

- ✓ Most youth who are about 13 do not see themselves as smokers or as non smokers. Among those who have never smoked, some of them think of doing it. Among those who have smoked, very few are addicted or have made the experience of this addiction. Most youth are therefore in an intermediary situation, where smoking is accepted, and where the objective benefits of being, later, a non-smoker adult, are well known. **The challenge is to connect this benefit in the future with their current daily life.** In the TV spots, stars accurately represent young adults who may be non-smokers (however, see previous remarks). But these characters, as well as the circumstances in which they are portrayed, are unrelated to daily life circumstances of the youth.
- ✓ The spots do not give their young audience any positive reasons (whether rational or emotional) not to smoke⁶. Admittedly, the “pop stars” spot gives two negative reasons: “smoking kills” and “don't be fooled”. But the negative reasons are not substantiated by the reality experienced by the youth, where most of their peers smoke as well as some of the adults who can represent moral references, e.g. parents, teachers... And the 13 year-old interviewed youth are not self-assured enough, from a psychological point of view, to judge that these peer groups and reference adults are wrong.
- ✓ Smoking is physically an unpleasant experience - that is what the focus groups say, and it might be a reason not to smoke - but they hardly say that. The first cigarette was bad, and quite no adolescents in any of the groups spontaneously indicated smoking itself as a pleasure.. Almost none of them smokes alone. The benefit of smoking just consists in more consideration by others. But this consideration is an illusion: the youth do not specially appreciate the fact that anyone else smokes! The campaign does not take advantage of this paradoxical contrast between physical unpleasantness and illusory social agreement⁷.

⁶ Or only one : the association with the word "cool" in the "pop stars" spot ("Be cool, don't smoke", as Sophie Ellis Baxtor).

⁷ Whereas the 2003's B4-4 (non evaluated) clip seems to do.

- At first sight, the 2003 *press* campaign may address the three above problems that limit the impact of the "Feel free to say no" TV campaign. We tested the press ads very briefly with one group. They received a more enthusiastic and emotional response (e.g. identification with some of the youth shown in the ads) than the 2002 TV campaign.
- ✓ For the reasons mentioned above, a potential impact of the message of the campaign on behavioural intentions seems unlikely, in both directions: the campaign does not incite to smoke (some experts in the field, had, initially, expressed the concern that it might eventually have this negative effect).
- ✓ The discussions in the focus groups clearly highlight important factors that can limit potential for success of some alternative communication strategies, at least with 12-14 years old:
 - ❖ Brands and cigarette marketing have little place in their universe. Smoking is independent from buying a cigarette. We therefore cannot detect any potential of success for a truth campaign against tobacco manufacturers.
 - ❖ The long-term risk is well known by 14 years old adolescents (at least in a general way), but is not related to any aspect of their daily life, neither to the group of (young) smokers they know. We therefore cannot detect any potential of success for a "death" campaign, e.g. that says: "Tobacco kills x million people".

In other words, the strategy chosen by MC seems appropriated, at least for the 12-14 year old target, provided that characters are portrayed that the youth can relate more closely to, and demonstrating how the non-smoking message can relate to their daily life events.

- ✓ Some alternative strategies that government and NGO representative in various countries (especially North Europe, France) consider relevant, base upon:
 - ❖ The **near** danger of addiction - especially for 14-18 years old youth.
 - ❖ The immediate impact of tobacco use on beauty and health.

Those were not tested during the focus groups, but the content of discussions suggest that they would fit better to the mindsets of adolescents, than "truth" or "death" strategies.

2.6 *The European added value remains to be defined*

- ✓ The most obvious added value of the European intervention, as stated by most experts, is that this campaign has just been possible, while, in some Member States, national players are not undertaking large-scale campaigns on this topic and for this target.
- ✓ The European Commission is not specifically in a better position than national players to carry out a TV campaign, to build a "lifestyle" non-smoking brand, or to foster local prevention activities. The "European added value" of a European-based campaign is not evident at first glance. The pan-European and English-speaking approach for this young target audience (12-14 years old) is questionable, as young people at this age are limited in their comprehension of English.

- ✓ The sponsorship of this campaign by the European Commission has not been noticed by the youth. Therefore, it cannot have had any specific impact, either positive or negative, on the target audience.
- ✓ The limited number of national and international organisations actively committed to tobacco epidemics prevention, have been directly informed by the Commission about the campaign being released, especially through a series of meetings. The information flow, in both directions, has increased through the creation of a Panel of Experts (autumn 2002) and later the institution of National Focal Points (from December 2002). The perception of the Commission involvement by the national players appears closely related to the added legitimacy they have been granted (as focal points), that is to say, independently from the assessment of the campaign's content. There are two typical ways to look at the involvement of the European Commission:
 - ❖ In those countries where the local government is not very active regarding tobacco epidemics prevention, the EC involvement is perceived very positively;
 - ❖ In the countries where there is some local experience and technical expertise in the area of tobacco epidemics prevention (mainly English speaking countries and in Nordic countries) the EC involvement is perceived as being of little use, eventually interfering with local initiatives.

- ✓ According to many stakeholders, the Commission could have a more active role in facilitating exchange of experiences, translation and dissemination of good practices in the field of tobacco epidemics prevention. The interviewees in different countries suggest that information could circulate better and more disseminated than now.

The way in which the 2002 campaign was managed, at short notice, and the budget mainly spent on a pan-European TV spot (rather than in national or local grassroots actions, as foreseen in the initial bid, inhibited a constructive dialogue on the content of the campaign and on the prevention strategies with the Commission/ Media Consulta.

The partnership building meeting which took place in 2002, as well as the new structure of the 2003 campaign, including print ads in magazines, proved to be better adapted to the countries' needs and fostered a more constructive dialogue allowing to share experiences.

However, some national stakeholders rejected the pan-European campaign supported by the Commission, believing it is not adapted to the youth in their countries: these stakeholders tend to keep out of the dialogue wished by the Commission.

- ✓ A specific "European added value" consists in this debate at the international level. The campaign (and its evaluation) have given opportunities to stakeholders from all Member States, to share views and experiences about smoking prevention.
- ✓ The format of the material used in 2002 - 20' TV spots, A4 format leaflets, and even the web site - was not intended, and is not very adapted, for a further pedagogical use, for instance in schools or for other local prevention efforts.

Even a specific design would not have granted an effective grassroots utilisation of the media material. Educational institutions must necessarily be involved too - which is known to require a long-lasting effort, implying heterogeneous results depending on the institution and Member State.

2.7 Recommendations synthesis

The evaluation includes "short-term" recommendations to improve the current campaign, "long-term" discussions of possible options for the EC and specific provisions regarding the global evaluation that could take place in 2004.

The "short-term" recommendations regarding the current campaign are the following.

- ✓ R1 - Keep the focus on youth between 12 and 18,
- ✓ R2 - Design the campaign in the same general style than in 2002.

Fine-tune the social marketing approach to increase potential impact:

- ✓ R3 - Invest time and money into a more professional social marketing approach, including more use of literature, and pre-testing the campaigns;
- ✓ R4 - Given the budget limitations, look for indirect impact (leverage effect) rather than direct one. Therefore, try to have an impact on the messages conveyed by mass media and by institutions.

Show the real life and be based on real motivations of the youth:

- ✓ R5 - Adapt the message more to national languages: the message should be perceived as expressed by a peer, and not translated from elsewhere in Europe.
- ✓ R6 - *Possibly* focus more on freedom, on the benefit of remaining free rather than becoming addicted, and the ways to remain free.
- ✓ R7 - Show real people in their daily life context, instead of actors and studio pictures.

Comply with the quality principles of professional media communication:

- ✓ R8 - Keep it different from existing campaigns: i.e. create a world, simultaneously consistent with the previous messages (2002 and 2003), and open to changes in time and to different specifications in different places.
- ✓ R9 - Determine specific targets. One could be more specific than "12 to 18 years old", especially if press is the main media used.
- ✓ R10 - Determine specific objectives regarding this target, and consistent with the available budget.
- ✓ R11 - Have only one consistent communication strategy (instead of several ones simultaneously).
- ✓ R12 - Evaluate ex ante (pre-test needed, baseline desirable), and also ex-post (classic as well as comparative post-tests needed). «Don't be fooled» by false positives, i.e. by the percentage of respondents "aware of the campaign" who would also have said to be aware of a non-existent campaign, because of confusion in the media "noise".

Whatever the strategy, comply with the specific principles regarding the youth target:

- ✓ R13 - Look different from ads.



- ✓ R14 - Use cross-cultural references, taking into account the fast changes in the subcultures of the teenagers.
- ✓ R15 - If the target public is aged around 13-14 years, "sell" immediate benefits for the teenager in his/her relation to the group.
- ✓ R16 - Remember that the (young) target group is different from the stakeholders' group, and therefore share decision-making with people from this target group.

In a long-term perspective, a review of opportunities and threats around the communication actions of the Commission highlights two challenges for an effective action:

- **How to support denormalization of tobacco at the micro-social level?** (within the peer groups, at school...)
- **How to build on the European perspective**, that only the EC and its partners have, while remaining within the framework of EC legal competences?

To have a leverage effect at the micro-social level, communication should be intended to create re-usable material, on specific physical or digital supports. The EC should also obtain at least a passive co-operation by educational institutions.

Suggestions are made to build on EC competences, or on its obviously specific Europe-wide perspective: channel "bottom-to-bottom" information, i.e. let successful local actions be known by educators of all Europe (that requires to look for these actions, as they will not be visible by themselves); communicate on EU-wide policies and changes, look for a synergy between the communication and the EC regulations; provide "European information" on tobacco prevention, that is presently missing; and so on.

While a pan-european mass communication focused on quitting is unlikely to get any impact as long as the campaign budgets remain in the same range (presently less around 6 cents for each European smoker), decentralised actions to support national and local quitting campaigns could also be imagined, as soon as these support actions prove to have a specific added value.

Regarding the global evaluation of the campaign, two common evaluation patterns may answer some of the evaluative questions the EC and its partners will ask:

- The quantitative estimation of the results of the campaign, mainly consisting in a large sample survey among youth;
- The expert review based upon existing data, mainly consisting in analyses and summaries of these data, to clarify a whole of questions regarding decisions to take.

More detailed technical provisions are specified regarding the first pattern: the sample size needed is at least 6,400; a specific survey inside schools, simultaneously in all Member States, is the most meaningful option; most of the methodological provisions of the Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS) should be considered relevant, and a support by WHO could therefore be useful; the costs might be around 228 000 € (fees only), but this figure should be considered as a very raw estimate.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

General introduction to the recommendations (3.1 to 3.3)

Terms of reference require that evaluators "*recommend a strategy for the management of future campaigns*". In fact, evaluation of the 2002 campaign, by itself, does not provide a sufficient basis for strategy building, especially considering the possibility of taking completely new strategic directions.

That is the reason why **three very different kinds of recommendations**, with different status, will be exposed hereafter:

- **Short-term recommendations: keeping the same line and strategy, how can the campaign perform better?**
 - These recommendations are "short-term" ones because they should be especially relevant for the 2004 campaign. As the strategy and general spirit of the campaign would, in this hypothesis, remain unchanged, the implications of strengths and weaknesses of the 2002 campaign are quite direct and certainly relevant.
- **Indications for the medium and long-term**, depending on the intentions and strategy of the Commission: Media campaigning? Capacity building? etc.
 - The analysis of the 2002 campaign, as well as opinions expressed by many experts, suggest that new directions could be taken by the Commission *in the prevention and communication field* (other fields - regulations, prices, etc., remain outside of our scope). Should new strategic options be taken by the Commission, the evaluation can provide several advices, identifying risks and opportunities in the environment of the campaign (sources: literature review, other topics covered in the focus groups and the interviews, etc.). These hints remain only *indications*, they are a contribution to the expert debate regarding the Commission's strategy.
- **Recommendations for the next evaluation.**
 - The Commission intends to carry on a global evaluation of the 2002-2004 campaign, evaluation which should take place in 2004 and provide perspectives for the following years. The methodology and budget of this evaluation depend on the questions the Commission and its advisors will consider as high-priority ones. The evaluators are nevertheless able to describe, basing upon their own expertise and upon the literature, two possible evaluation patterns, and specify what kind of questions could be answered by each of these two kinds of evaluations.

Taking orientations belongs to the Commission; Media Consulta works on one-year contracts, but in accordance with a bid covering three campaign years; a Panel of Experts provides scientific support, and the National Focal Points provide also an expertise: the role of the evaluators' recommendations is therefore limited. Their aim is to facilitate the taking into account of the evaluation's findings.

3.1 Recommendations to optimize the current campaign

3.1.1 Design the 2004 campaign in the same general style that in 2002

The 2002 experience has shown the feasibility of a pan-European campaign, targeted youth around 14, a sensitive age for smoking, and has reached a good consistency between its aim, style, and media. It is therefore possible, in 2004, to:

- ✓ R1 - Keep the focus on youth between 12 and 18,
- ✓ R2 - Design the campaign in the same general style than in 2002.

3.1.2 Fine-tune the social marketing approach to increase potential impact

The 2002 campaign has shown the difficulty of conveying a pan-European message, especially on adolescents younger than 14. It had no opportunity to get any proven direct impact, due to the low budget compared to the broad goals of the campaign, and due to the lack of pre-testing as well as post-testing. It also had no opportunity to achieve indirect impact on the youth, due to the absence of connection of the campaign with educational institutions and professions.

- ✓ R3 - Invest time and money into a more professional social marketing approach, including the use of more literature, and pre-testing the campaigns (see the next recommendations for more details).
- ✓ R4 - Given the budget limitations, look for indirect impact (leverage effect) rather than direct one. Therefore, try to have an impact on the messages conveyed by mass media and by institutions (also see 3.2 for more details).
 - For example, a tour like the "Truck Tour" in 2003 is fruitful insofar as it attracts the media. Its success or failure should be measured on this scale.

3.1.3 Show the real life and base on the real motivations of the youth

The tone of the TV ads has been appreciated, but English is problematic with many young people under 14; "free" is a relevant word, but its association with "say no" is dubious; stars are relevant characters, but most of the pop stars taking part to the campaign target a public under 14; in any case, the use of real characters instead of actors is a strength of the campaign, but presenting them as stars ("testimonial" spot) instead of showing daily life non-smoking situations, reduces potential impact.

- ✓ R5 - Adapt the message more to national languages: the message should be perceived as expressed by a peer, and not translated from elsewhere in Europe.
 - To take into account the country-wide trends in marketing towards young people.
 - To collaborate more in-depth with national partners is therefore necessary.

- ✓ R6 - *Possibly* focus more on freedom, on the benefit of remaining free rather than becoming addicted, and the ways to remain free.
 - This is only one possible direction for the campaign. The creative potential of the communication agency should be used to find other possible directions!
 - A rewriting of the slogan, such as "Feel free: say no", could be considered.
- ✓ R7 - Show real people in their daily life context, instead of actors and studio pictures.
 - This recommendation is fulfilled by the 2003 *press* campaign.

3.1.4 Comply with the quality principles of professional media communication

The following five recommendations may look as obvious, as basic knowledge in the communication field, but the 2002 campaign complies with only the two first ones. So it may be useful to emphasize these principles⁸.

- ✓ R8 - Keep it different from existing campaigns: i.e. create a world, simultaneously consistent with the previous messages (2002 and 2003), and open to change in time and to different specifications in different places.
- ✓ R9 - Determine specific targets. One could be more specific than "12 to 18 years old", especially if press is the main media used.
- ✓ R10 - Determine specific objectives regarding this target, and consistent with the available budget.

The 2002 budget was around 20 cents per individual in the target. It is widely assumed that around 1 euro is needed to achieve one single outcome - for example, letting one simple information be learned by the target, or leaving one visual impression such as a colour, or having the presence of a character been memorized... ("not beginning to smoke" is not a single outcome, but the eventual impact of many converging outcomes by different actions).

So, a precise outcome should be specified for the campaign, and, if the budget remains as the same level, the target public should be reduced by a factor around 5 (for example, "girls aged 14 to 16").

- ✓ R11 - Have only one consistent communication strategy (instead of several ones simultaneously).

As an obvious consequence of R8-R9-R10 as it is, this rule is hardly compatible with collective decision-making ("comitology"). Collective decisions often lead to split budgets into actions with different aims and messages (in 2002 already with stars against tobacco on TV, as well as smokers' lungs on the website).

⁸ Also consider using the CDC's handbook or the (French-speaking) Belgian one: [Guide pour les campagnes de promotion de la santé à la radio et à la télévision](#), Conseil supérieur de promotion de la santé de la Communauté française de Belgique, no date found (1998 or later).

- ✓ R12 - Evaluate ex ante (pre-test needed, baseline desirable), as well as ex-post (classic as well as comparative post-tests needed). «Don't be fooled» by false positives, i.e. by the percentage of respondents "aware of the campaign" who would also have said to be aware of a non-existent campaign, because of confusion in the media "noise".

Each of these tests should be carried on a professional way.

The qualitative pre-tests should be linked intimately with the design and implementation of the campaign. They can be conducted by an institute contracting with MC (using a fraction of the campaign budget), to ensure the most intimate linkage with the campaign; or by an institute commissioned independently by the Commission and working in close relation with MC.

Classic post-tests are based on quantitative surveys, to be carried on specifically on behalf of the Commission, immediately after the campaign flights. General statistics on the numbers of readers of magazines are not at all a measurement of awareness, not writing impact: becoming aware requires opening the magazine (this defines readership), then seeing the right page, then reading it, then memorizing at least a part of the content. Only specific surveys can measure that⁹. And comparative measures - not standard in post-test methods - are needed to know if the campaign performs better, or worse, than any other ones. See 3.3 (evaluation).

Baseline surveys would be desirable to measure changes, in connection with the specific objective of the campaign (R10): is there any progress towards the objective?

3.1.5 Whatever the strategy, comply with the specific principles regarding the youth target

There is controversy about the most effective strategy to promote non-smoking among the youth: "shock", "truth", "lifestyle" strategies ... even the most experienced institutions, like the American CDC or Health Canada, consider that question as open and mix different approaches (with much higher budgets than those available in Europe). But whatever the strategy, specific conditions are to be fulfilled in order to reach the youth. Pechmann, *J. Marketing*, as well as the CDC handbook¹⁰, provide important guidelines.

- ✓ R13 - Look different from ads¹¹.
The teenagers are advertising-adverse.
- ✓ R14 - Use cross-cultural references, taking into account the fast changes in the subcultures of the teenagers¹².

⁹ The situation is slightly better for TV and radio, which do not meet the issue of "turning the right page". The audience figures indicate how many people in the target group have heard the right ad (especially on TV, radio audience figures are less precise). But they do not indicate whether they have listened to it, or memorized it.

¹⁰ Designing and Implementing an Effective Tobacco Counter-Marketing Campaign.

¹¹ The 2002 campaign complied pretty well with that recommendation. Added media coverage (editorial features) distinguishes clearly the message from advertising.

¹² The 2002 campaign tried to use this way to reach the youth.

Worldwide branding, models, stars, products, information, reach the European youth. But their accurateness as bases for smoking prevention may be short-lived.

- ✓ R15 - If the target public is aged around 13-14 years, "sell" immediate benefits for the teenager in his/her relation to the group¹³.

The pre-adolescents or young adolescents don't care much about their own health, they don't care about long term, but they are under social pressure. This is the motivation that should be activated by campaign: to give them ways to feel immediately better inside their (micro-social) peer group.

If the campaign strategy is "lifestyle", showing that it is great to be a non-smoker is irrelevant (teenagers know that): the issue is to show that they will feel better after refusing the cigarette offered by a friend.

In the context of a "shock" or "death" strategy, showing that one may die from smoking is irrelevant (the teenagers know that, and they have to become adults before facing that risk): the issue is to show them that non-smoking will save their life now, as adolescents - saving their skin, their teeth, their lungs, their brains.

In the context of a "truth" strategy, saying that the tobacco industry sells mortal products is irrelevant (the teenagers know that, but, at least under 15, they hardly buy anything to the industry): the issue is to show that these mortal products are here, near their hands¹⁴.

- ✓ R16 - Remember that the (young) target group is different from the stakeholders' one, and therefore share decision-making with people from this target group.

«Effective advertising must reach the people where they are and not where we want them to be. Remember you are not a target» (CDC's Karen Gutierrez at WCTOH, Helsinki).

The increasing number of experts and stakeholders in the decision process has many positive effects, especially to ensure that the European campaign does not interfere harmfully with national messages. But it may also have an important negative effect: the absence of teenagers' points of view in decision-making. For example, discussing a storyboard with experts is highly useful; but, instead of asking for their own feelings about the storyboard, showing them teenagers' reactions to this storyboard, and asking them for their analyses and suggestions regarding these teenagers' reactions would be more useful.

In classic marketing, the feedback from the market is the ultimate judge (if the advertised product loses market share, the ad is supposed to have been bad). Regarding social marketing and health prevention, these signals are low and fuzzy. The risk arises to focus on a small institutional public (satisfy this public, do a public relations job), instead of focusing on results. A piece of the solution is to share decision-making with people from the target group, able to recall the points of view of this group. See the example of the Canadian Youth Action Committee (YAC), a panel of 20 smoking and non-smoking teenagers.

¹³ This is not sensible in the 2002 campaign.

¹⁴ The 2003 TV ad has been created after the evaluation and was not within its scope. More extensive comments from the literature about fear appeals can be found at part 4.3.3.

3.2 Recommendations depending on the Commission's future strategy

The evaluators have tried to identify, from the evaluation itself and from general knowledge, lessons which could help the Commission to design future communication actions after the present 2002-2004 campaign, so **in a long-term perspective**. The relevance of these lessons depends on the future strategic options of the Commission. These hints are therefore not to be ranked at the same level than the previous short-term recommendations (part 3.1), and do not constitute a numbered list.

3.2.1 Perspectives on future strategies: opportunities and threats in the environment of any tobacco control communication action by the Commission

Tobacco control communication actions by the Commission will intervene in an environment offering both opportunities and threats. This is sensible at several levels:

	Opportunities	Threats
1. Recipients' environment	Denormalization happens at micro-social level	(Non)smoking (at 13+) results from perceived micro-social normality
2. Possible targets for media campaigns	More money can be «available» (as announced by the EC)	Effective direct media campaigns require much (more) money
3. National institutional environment	Implication of most Member States and Health Authorities	(Various strategies)
4. Institutional environment at the European level	The advantage of European perspective	No EU competence

1. The first level, i.e. the micro-social environment of the teenager, is, according to our findings, the level where decisions are taken regarding beginning to smoke or not, *around 13*. The teenager tries to comply with the norms of his/her environment.

- This is a very different situation, from the case of adults concerned by smoking cessation: cessation, regarding addicted smokers, is an essentially individual process, as addiction is. Repeated experience shows that micro-social interactions, even as intense as mother-child ones (case of pregnant women smoking), are not compelling enough to result in stopping; whereas personal interactions are the vector of smoking initiation behaviours.

This makes an effective pan-European mass communication difficult, as interaction with micro-social processes requires a subtle adaptation to various cultural situations. But this situation also conceals opportunities, because a denormalization process is on the way indeed, and mass communication may be effective in supporting and strengthening this process, in extending the range of the positive social interactions.

2. Regarding media campaigning, the feasibility of effective media planning results from the adequacy between the size and accessibility of the target, and the available budget. According to the declarations by spokesperson of the Commission's services at WCTOH Helsinki, increased budgets could likely be made available in the forthcoming years (from the Tobacco Community Fund or possibly from other sources); that is an opportunity to go on with mass media action on pan-European targets.

But, as mentioned above, effective campaigns targeting "the youth" as a whole, or the general public, would need *much* larger budgets¹⁵.

3. The levels 2 and 3 - the level of media campaigns and the national institutional level, including the case of federated governments - are the ones where public health institutions operate. It is, in most Member States, also the level where education is managed. The interactions between education and health concerns are maximal at this level, which is therefore a relevant action level for smoking prevention, even if, in some cases, political arbitrations may be unfavourable to tobacco control actions.

- Another evaluation led by evalua in 2003, regarding development education, has highlighted a similar situation: in most European countries (France is an exception), most efforts in this field are dedicated to supporting and feeding the teachers' interventions in their classrooms. Development education joins the broader topic of "global education".

This opportunity - a government level with potential effectiveness in tobacco prevention - conceals a difficulty for the European Commission: as the Commission has a very limited legal competence in the field of public health, support by the Commission to national or local Ministries on tobacco prevention may be considered cautiously, and the contact may be difficult to establish.

4. The 4th level, the European one, is a quite poor one regarding possible operations in the field of tobacco *prevention*. Some networks of NGOs or national institution are present at this pan-European level: these networks are not operational structures, but intermediaries between operational (national, local) organizations and the Commission. These networks may be, and are, partners for the Commission, insofar as they can direct its policies and its financings¹⁶; even working together, the Commission and the networks do not have great possibilities of action on line, but they may have a pan-European perspective on the health situation as well as on the actions led everywhere in Europe.

¹⁵ The Provincial Government of Québec allocates 2 MnCan\$ in 2001-2002 to communication actions targeted at the teenagers from 11 to 13 years old that is 3.5 Can\$ (+2.3 €) per capita and per annum. The States of the USA and the federal government have allocated, from 1999 to 2002, 2.25 BnUS\$ to tobacco prevention, that is around 2 US\$ (+1.8 €) per capita and per annum. The research A mass media programme to prevent smoking among adolescents: costs and cost effectiveness (RH Secker-Walker et alii, Tobacco Control, 1997, Vol 6, 207-212) suggests a cost of \$8 per student potentially exposed to a national four-year campaign. 2 € per capita, on the target "Europeans aged 12 to 18" = 60 Mn€.

¹⁶ Of course, their pressure may threaten to divert the Commission's fundings into administrative expenditures.

This review of opportunities and threats around the communication actions of the Commission, highlights two challenges for an effective action:

- How to support denormalization of tobacco at the micro-social level? (within the peer groups, at school...)
- How to build on the European perspective that only the EC and its partners have, while remaining within the framework of EC legal competences?

3.2.2 Local scale challenge: How to support denormalization of tobacco at the micro-social level? (within the peer groups, at school...)

The Commission is not a micro-social stakeholder, but its communication might be designed in order to improve its synergy with micro-social denormalization of smoking:

- Create re-usable material, specific supports based on of the media campaign:
 - ❖ Re-usable by the youth themselves (to be downloaded on websites, forwarded by emails ...).
 - ❖ Re-usable in schools, for training (teacher's kits: material, sizes, contents, tailored for the use with a group of around 25 teenagers during around 50 minutes).
 - ❖ Available through the web as well as through and local channels and institutions interested.
 - Therefore, fine-tuned for each country/region.
- Contact and feed educational institutions: they should at least tolerate the use of the material disseminated by the EC.
- Call for Proposals by local stakeholders: this tool (the CFP) is time-consuming, and each "grassroot" project funded will usually have very limited impact at the European scale.

3.2.3 European scale challenge: How could the communication build on EC competences, or on its Europe-wide perspective (if desired)?

While the limitations to its legal competences obstructs the action of the Commission, its pan-European perspective opens opportunities for specific added value:

- Channel "bottom-to-bottom" information, i.e. let successful local actions be known by educators of all Europe.
 - During a former evaluation, we have stated that educators were submerged by information of all kind regarding tobacco, tobacco related diseases, addiction and so on, but had very little information about successful prevention actions led at their level.

- As a matter of fact, actions at "grassroot" level with proven success may be seldom; that is a reason why information processes to *search and find* them, to *analyse and summarize* them, and then to *let them be known all over Europe*, could be very valuable.
- Communicate on EU-wide policies and changes? Publicize the decisions of the Union in the field of tobacco control, to let their consequences be anticipated by the European?
 - We were surprised to note that the briefs delivered by the Commission to MC did never refer to the other policy actions of the Commission, i.e. regarding tobacco advertising, tobacco prices and taxes, and so on.
 - A synergy could probably be found (if desired by the Commission), i.e. the communication could be focused on giving life and colors to the tobacco free Europe, that the European regulations are preparing; on anticipating on future behaviours, related to these regulations.
- Reduce the (possible) information gap on tobacco, and on European tobacco control, between the 15 present Member States and the 10 new Member States?
 - This is a long-term perspective, as such communication cannot be supported by the European budget (here, by the Tobacco Community Fund) in 2005.
- Support and fund actions in connection with WHO's initiative for a Tobacco Free Europe?
- Provide "European information" on tobacco prevention, that is presently missing:
 - ❖ European vs. national: each country/region says that its own campaign works, but nobody knows, due to the lack of comparative research with adequate design. Using each country (or policy level, such as Belgian Communities or German Länder) as a distinct case, meaningful comparative research could be led.
 - ❖ European vs. American: it seems that a huge majority of the literature regarding the results of smoking prevention actions, deals with Northern American experiences. But the social behaviours are different in Europe, and the advertising cultures are different too: which tobacco control strategies do work *here in Europe*? Evidence is missing.

Such "European information" might attract the media and publicize tobacco control.

Calls for Proposals make more sense in this context, i.e. for proposals at the European level and scale, than for local actions. Their effectiveness is nevertheless dubious as soon as the Commission has been able to define specific objectives and expectations, because the answers to CFPs usually express the intentions and policies of the answering institutions, not those of the author of the CFP.

Classical Calls for Tenders might be more appropriate.

3.2.4 Inputs to consider, depending on three strategic scenarios

The Commission can probably not fulfil all of the possible objectives described above. It will be necessary to define one strategy option, around which a bunch of consistent actions will be organized.

Three possible strategies have been supported by at least some of the stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation.

- Strategy of capacity building,
- Direct communication strategy, focused on "quitting",
- Direct communication strategy, focused on primary prevention (the strategy chosen in 2002).

The feasibility and consequences of these three strategies are shortly discussed below.

3.2.4.1 Inputs for a "capacity building" strategy (if chosen)

Compared to the 2002 campaign, this strategy will require more public relations, more exchange of information on existing prevention material.

Less budgets would be allocated to new communication towards the general public: nevertheless, the Commission might wish that much prevention campaign material be created, for comparative purposes (research and development of new campaign concepts, comparative tests on different cultural areas, dissemination on findings to competent institutions of all of the Member States).

The legitimacy of the action of the Commission will be increased if this action is focused on EU-specific information, like pan-European comparisons or data, or developments regarding the European regulations on tobacco.

Whatever the options, "capacity building" needs precise tactics:

- Precise intentions, objectives, means, expected results - if funds are subcontracted to an external office of agency, this delegation requires very detailed specifications regarding the tasks to fulfil;
- A kind of marketing: due to the lack of EC legal competence in the field of public health, support features or capacity building will remain an offer of services to other stakeholders (at the national and regional levels), who will subscribe, or not, to this offer. For this reason, the results and impact will be heterogeneous across Europe: they will depend on the country and region.

3.2.4.2 Inputs for a "direct communication" strategy focused on "quitting" (if chosen)

Some stakeholders support the idea of a commitment of the Commission into quitting communication.

Two options are possible:

- Either an autonomous, pan-European campaign, supposed to get results by itself;

- Or a contribution to other campaigns, an effort designed to increase the impact of other existing campaigns and actions.

The first option requires very large budgets, as tobacco is highly addictive: high costs are clearly to be spent to have 1 person quit, even if we haven't found reliable estimates - the literature highlights that primary prevention among the youth is supposed to be more cost-effective¹⁷. It does not seem meaningful, in any case, to expect any result with a budget lower than 2€ for each smoker in the target group - so, around 200 Mn€ if all European smokers are targeted.

This option may make sense if smaller target groups (around 1 Mn people across Europe, for example) are identified as a core target for the action of the EC. But such target definitions (regarding smokers) haven't appeared so far in the public debate.

The second option takes into account the findings of research: quitting is known to be an individual and micro-social process; a media campaign can reach impact through its combination with local action: quitline, support by general practitioners...

Implementing this second option would probably imply a decentralised management of the campaign, at the national or regional level, where other campaigns are led and where public health institutions work. Once again, the specific added value of the European action and funding would need to be identified.

3.2.4.3 Inputs for a "direct communication" strategy focused on "primary prevention" (if kept)

Direct communication focused on "primary prevention", is the object of the 2002 campaign. If this strategy is kept, most of the short-term recommendations (3.1 above) should remain relevant.

¹⁷ For example (even if outdated) : "Smoking-cessation programs tend to have low success rates. Recruiting and retaining adolescents in formal cessation programs are difficult." Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the [US] Surgeon General (Executive Summary), 1994

3.3 Recommendations for the global evaluation of the campaign in 2004

3.3.1 Possible priorities for the global evaluation

The context of the next evaluation will be deeply different from the context of the present evaluation. The DG SANCO has gained experience with media campaigning. Thanks to the expert consultations organised at Luxemburg, the Commission benefits from significant expert consultancy and expert opinions about the accomplishments and failures of the campaign.

As for any evaluation, the Commission will have the choice between three possible directions - usually referred to as "impact", "managerial" and "formative evaluation":

- To assess the results and the impact of the campaign?
- To provide hints for later actions?
- To give an opportunity for information-sharing between stakeholders?

Managerial evaluation is sometimes considered as a compromise between impact and formative evaluation¹⁸, but each direction leads to the choice of specific methods and expertise: scientific methods to assess impact, consultancy skills to provide hints, coaching and facilitation approaches to favour information sharing.

The public of the evaluation should also be defined:

- Is the evaluation mainly intended to inform the Commission about the campaign subcontracted to a communication agency?
- Or is it mainly intended to disseminate lessons from this EC experiment, usable by all stakeholders and institutions in the field of tobacco control?

In the latter situation, a broader, comparative scope will be especially useful ; in the first situation, more in-depth auditing will be required regarding the working process and the accomplishments of MC.

There is a link between both questions. If a very large audience is targeted, a scientific assessment of the impact of the campaign is needed; it will confer an academic status to the results of the "Feel free" campaign. If the stakeholders working together with the EC are the main target audience, a formative evaluation may be efficient. If the public is restricted to the DG SANCO itself, a managerial evaluation should be accurate. Depending on these choices, the communication regarding the evaluation may be one of the evaluators' tasks.

¹⁸ The standard concept of "summative evaluation" describes an assessment work, generally covering all steps of the programme including its impact, and resulting in recommendations for the management.

There are several common evaluation patterns or scenarios. Two of them may fulfil some of the previous requirements:

- The quantitative estimation of the results of the campaign, mainly consisting in a **large sample survey** among youth;
 - This evaluation method is a standard one in the fields of communication as well as public health.
- The **expert review based upon existing data**, mainly consisting in analyses and summaries of these data, to clarify a whole of questions regarding decisions to take.
 - This approach is the most common one in programme evaluation / evaluation of public policies.

Of course, these two scenarios can be combined; but, as they require different abilities and research tasks, they should be planned separately, possibly with different timetables.

The importance of gathering primary quantitative data on the campaign, through a quantitative survey designed for this purpose, depends on the focus of the evaluation:

- ❖ Such data would be needed for a scientific assessment, but only if a measurable impact is expected: for the present evaluation of the 2002 campaign, potential impacts were one of the main topics, but the limited media budget and the time run out since the two flights, prohibited any quantitative measurement.
- ❖ The need of the management for quantitative data on impacts depends on the decision issues faced by the Commissioner and by DG SANCO. This need may be crucial if impact is at stake ; it may be much lower if the Commission does not plan to finance new pan-European media campaigns in this field.
- ❖ Within a formative process, information-sharing between participants can be rich and conclusive without new data being brought by the evaluators.

But in addition, if a pan-European quantitative survey is planned, this will be a big event *per se* in the field of tobacco control research. New objectives could be assigned to this survey. *Inter alia*, the survey would provide baseline data regarding the smoking behaviours of the target, with highly reliable inter-countries comparisons. The EC would then have to take into account these expectations - which may also be an opportunity for additional financing on this survey.

3.3.2 Evaluation Scenario 1: a quantitative estimation of results

3.3.2.1 Sample size needed: at least 6,400

A quantitative estimation of results requires a survey on a "large sample". How large ?

- Epidemiologic surveys often use samples of 10,000 or more cases; the error margin on a percentage is then + -1%, if the measure is unbiased.
- Post-test surveys of advertising campaigns often use smaller samples around 400; the error margin on a percentage is then + -5%, if the measure is unbiased: this may be a sufficient precision to measure awareness and agreement to a message, on an homogeneous target group.

Regarding the "Feel free" campaign, it may not be enough to evaluate the pan-European TV messages. A significant part of the budget has been allocated to local media and messages, for example to the press coverage in 2003, or to the Truck Tour with national events. Some experts have therefore expressed a need for national evaluations of the campaign. If a quantitative survey is to be led, the minimum sample would therefore be 400 for each country.

The relevant unit is not exactly the country, but merely the coverage area of each media: a mix of national and linguistic areas. For practical purposes, we have considered that Belgium should be divided into two areas, while other countries count only for one area: even if public health is managed at a more local level (Länder in Germany for example), the coverage area of the media encompasses the whole Member State.

A minimal sample size would then be $6,400 = 16$ area samples of 400 each¹⁹.

3.3.2.2 The most meaningful option: a specific survey inside schools

We have reviewed shortly 4 methodological options to carry out this survey:

- ❖ Specific survey in schools;
- ❖ Survey carried out from a central point independently from existing institutions (as the qualitative survey has been, for the present evaluation);
- ❖ Integration of questions regarding the campaign, in existing barometers;
- ❖ Use of the standard post-test methodologies available on each area.

¹⁹ For 15 countries. A survey encompassing the 10 new Member States (i.e. 10 additional areas with samples of 400) would obviously be welcome if the financial mechanisms give opportunity for it.

The table below summarizes the pros and contras of each option:

	<u>Marginal</u> cost per interview	Pros	Contras	Conclusion
Survey in schools	+ -3€ to +- 15€ (organisation cost)	Large sample, visual questions	Group/age/region bias (also for GYTS), agreements needed	Feasible, low marginal cost, but high organisation prerequisites
Independent centralized survey	+ -30€ (cost: reach the youth)	High quality control / barometer	Cost, limits of telephone	Unaffordable regarding a teenager target
Integration of questions in barometers	+ -1€/question	Cross variables. Low cost if the questionnaire is short.	Simultaneous barometers on <u>teenagers</u> in all MS do not exist	Impossible regarding a teenager target
National media pre and post-tests.	? (general public sample)	In-country, cross-campaigns comparisons.	Low quality, no health dimensions	Suitable for the general public or a much enlarged target group.

The target of teenagers is especially difficult to reach. Under 15 (the threshold age depends on the country), an interviewer needs an authorisation by the parents of the interviewee. Telephone books are not an accurate sampling basis for youth under 18. If the questionnaire includes awareness questions (as it should obviously do), the survey should be carried out at the same moment in each country, or at least, within the same time limit after the broadcasting of the message: we haven't found any pan-European youth barometer providing that. And the reference surveys in the field of teenagers' health (HBSC) and smoking behaviours (GYTC) are carried out inside schools, not by classical household sampling methods.

National media quantitative pre and post-tests processes may be an option as long as the main focus is to measure awareness and not much more. But once again, the difficulty will be to find, in each country, reliable post-test offerings on a *teenager* target.

Thus, the most meaningful option is the specific survey in schools. We have reviewed this option in more depth. It has been found reliable by all experts (as HBSC or GYTS surveys use it) and its *marginal* cost is very low: in the range of 3€ for one additional questionnaire - collection cost only.

This method has nevertheless some drawbacks, including group effect, i.e. inter-correlation between the answers of the pupils of a same school or class. This effect reduces the effective sample size, i.e. the precision of the survey.

But the main issue regarding surveys in schools is the organisation cost, much higher than the collection cost. Agreements are needed from the schools and/or the education authorities, possibly from the parents, specific validations may be needed to guarantee privacy (anonymous questionnaires), the survey protocol and the interviewers' training must be rigorous as each word pronounced is heard by around 25 interviewees, and so on.

Thus, carrying out a pan-European school survey would be a significant accomplishment - and an event. Once decided, such a survey would provide two opportunities:

- The opportunity to collect systematic figures: the organisation cost is much lower the second time, so that the survey might be designed to initiate a barometer;
- The opportunity for a fruitful collaboration with WHO, which should be interested by the results, and could provide very useful support to carry out the survey.

For this reason, we used the methodology of the Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS) to work out guidelines for this evaluation survey.

3.3.2.3 Methodological specifications, based upon a review of GYTS Methodology²⁰

WHO's Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) provides technical assistance to the countries carrying out a GYTS; this technical assistance includes the following services:

- ❖ Overall coordination of the GYTS;
- ❖ Coordination and logistics of GYTS Workshops;
- ❖ GYTS questionnaire development;
- ❖ Training of GYTS Research Coordinators;
- ❖ Preparation of reports.

If WHO/TFI could provide the same services, or a part of them, for the evaluation of the "Feel free" campaign, it would increase both the feasibility and the quality of this survey.

²⁰ Most information regarding the GYTS methodology was found on the CDC's website.

Most of the methodological provisions of the GYTS are meaningful for the evaluation: either for comparison purposes with GYTS, for reasons specific to the evaluation, or because these provisions are valid for any investigation in schools or on youth. The table below displays most of these provisions:

Key methodological provisions of GYTS (below) and relevance for a quantitative evaluation of the "Feel Free" campaign (next columns).	Essential for comparisons with GYTS	Specially meaningful for Feel Free	Sound method // youth, whatever the topic
School-based survey of students aged 13-15 years	At least a 13-15 subsample (strata)	Yes (or 14-16)	
Can include public and private schools			Yes
Multistage sample design with schools selected proportional to enrollment size			Yes
Classrooms chosen randomly within selected schools			Yes
All students in selected classes eligible for participation			Yes
Anonymous and confidential self-administered questionnaire	Yes	Anonymous, but for a test "before and after", a "secret sign" self-id,.	Yes
Computer-scannable answer sheets			No (unessential)
Requires only 30-40 minutes to administer	Stay under 45'		Stay under 45'
Fieldwork conducted in 6-8 weeks		Shorter (1 week) and simultaneous, if pan-European actions are tested.	
Country-level data with regional level stratification possible	Yes	Yes (data level: linguistic area inside a country - or smaller)	
Core questionnaire	Same wording as GYTS for similar questions	Yes (ask first as much as possible of the core questionnaire)	
Country may add questions to the questionnaire		Yes (cover national events, magazines, campaigns).	

The target "14 to 16 years old" might be of interest, as this cohort might have been targeted by the three campaign years (these teenagers were 12 to 14 years old in 2002).



The questionnaire should also re-use a significant part of the GYTS questions - either for comparison purposes, or just because their quality is well assessed and because they are already translated in several languages.

GYTS is composed of "core" country-approved questions, designed to gather data on the following seven topics. We have mentioned in the first column, the degree of relevance of each topic for an evaluation questionnaire of "Feel free to Say no", taking into account the specific logical framework of this campaign. "XXX" means that the topic is central for the evaluation, "TBE" (to be enlarged) that the questionnaire should cover the topic more extensively and specifically than GYTS does, "0" is the lowest degree of priority.

1. Prevalence of cigarette smoking and other tobacco use among young people	
XXX	how many young people have experimented with smoking cigarettes or use other forms of tobacco products
XX	the age at which young people begin cigarette smoking
O	what brand of cigarettes young people smoke
X	where young people usually smoke
2. Knowledge and attitudes of young people towards cigarette smoking	
XXX	the strength of intention to remain nonsmokers among young people who never smoked (index of susceptibility)
XXX	what young people perceive to be the social benefits and the health risks of smoking cigarettes
XXX	the extent of peer pressure on young people to begin cigarette smoking
3. Role of the media and advertising on young people's use of cigarettes	
TBE	how receptive young people are to cigarette advertising and other activities that promote cigarette use
TBE	awareness and exposure of young people to antismoking messages
4. Access to cigarettes	
X	where young people usually get their cigarettes
O	whether sellers refuse to sell young people cigarettes because of their age
X	how much money young people spend on cigarettes
5. Tobacco-related school curriculum	
XX	what young people were taught in school about tobacco
XX	young people's perceptions of their school's programs to prevent cigarette use
6. Environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)	
XX	the extent of young people's exposure to smoking at home and in other places
XX	young people's perceptions about the harmful effects of ETS
7. Cessation of cigarette smoking	
TBE	the short- and long-term likelihood that young cigarette smokers will quit

3.3.2.4 Foreseeable costs of a pan-European school survey

The evaluation team includes methodological experts in the field of survey design, but does not include executives of survey institutes. The evaluators are not able to estimate the costs of a pan-European school survey with an error margin thinner than $\pm 50\%$. We have nevertheless found useful to write down first and very raw estimates, to help in the decision process regarding the opportunity and efficiency, of carrying out such a survey.

Apart from the "basic option" of a 6,400 sample, raw budget estimates have been computed for three additional features:

- Doubling the sample size ;
- Cutting one area into two parts (that is, adding one more area with a 400 sample)
- Carrying out not only a post-test survey, but also a first questionnaire before most actions of the 2004 campaign.

			Basic option.	Additional cost for three different options:				
			See comments	Daily cost estimate (euro)	(6400 questionnaires).	For 100% more questionnaires in the same areas	For 1 more area of 400 (marginal cost of 1 area)	For a pre-campaign questionnaire
Sample	Nr	(1)		6400	6400	400	+ 3200	
Areas	Nr			16	16	1	16	
Sample per area	Nr			400	400	400	+ 200	
Classes per area	Nr			20	20	20	+ 10	
Schools per area	Nr			6	6	6	+3	
"Interviewer" field days per area		(2)		6	6	6	+ 3	
"Interviewer" field days - total	Days			200	96	96	6	192
Writing of the core questionnaire	Days			800	12	0	0	7
Writing+validation of area versions	Days	(3)		550	80	0	4	20
Training of interviewers	Days			325	24	0	2	0
Management at nat'l lev.	Days	(4)		400	123	107	8	81
Management at central lev.	Days			800	32	0	2	16
Initial organisation with authorities	Days	(5)		800	16	0	1	16
Data entry, control	Days	(6)		250	67	67	4	133
International data file, weighting	Days			800	18	0	1	8
Statistical analysis, reporting	Days			800	36	0	2	22
Total number of days	Days			504	270	30	495	
Total estimated cost (fees only)	€			228 000	79 000	13 000	170 000	

Comments for the understanding of the budget estimates:

- (1) If two questionnaires are carried out on the same sample of classes, a significant attrition rate is to be expected. We suggest to define a sample of 9,600 (so 3,200 more than the basic option), providing for a final sample of 6,400 (both questionnaires "pre" and "post" completed and usable) in case of a 33% attrition rate.

- (2) The interviewer time spent "on the field" is small in the case of school surveys. One large part of the "interviewer's job" is done for free by schools, i.e. finding teenagers, gathering them, asking the parents for authorizations, and so on. But much time is to be spent in coordination and travels, especially to ensure proper collaboration from the schools.
- (3) As in the GYTS, the questionnaire must provide for inter-areas comparisons as well as for area-specific questions (many elements of the campaign are national or local). Even the core questionnaire is area-specific because it has to be translated. We suggest:
 - ❖ To use existing translation of GYTS questions;
 - ❖ To build international standard "container questions" able to include lists of national elements (lists of channels, magazines, dates of events...);
 - ❖ To forecast enough budget for translations in both ways: the local partner of the contractor (or of WHO) translates the international version and adds area-specific questions to create an area-specific questionnaire; this local partner sends the area questionnaire to the central coordination office, together with a translation of this area questionnaire into English; the central coordination office checks the translation and discusses possible changes with the local partner.
- (4) The time allocated to coordination work strongly increases in case of pre/post questionnaires. This increase relates to the management of the (filled) questionnaire forms between the 2 operations, to the problematic matching of some questionnaires, and so on²¹.
 - Altogether, taking into account the specific nature of the campaign to evaluate (started in 2002), an additional "pre-campaign" questionnaire seems to generate high costs for a limited added value ; to double the sample size (with only one questionnaire) seems more cost-effective.
- (5) Added organisation work with the authorities is also to be forecasted in case of pre/post questionnaires. The legal situation of questionnaire forms may indeed be problematic: guarantees regarding anonymity must be provided to the respondents, while the protocol must ensure the matching of the two forms filled by a same respondent.
- (6) Two options may be considered for data entry: to gather all questionnaires at the central office provides for higher quality control standards; to have all data being entered locally provides for more accurate linguistic understanding, in the case of unclear answers.

²¹ We have experienced that problem with a pre-post school questionnaire designed to evaluate and compare two AIDS prevention methods.

3.3.3 Evaluation Scenario 2: an expert review based upon existing data

3.3.3.1 Implications of Scenario 2

A research based on a quantitative survey, such as the one described above (3.3.2), may be unefficient if the questions asked to the evaluators relate to many topics other than awareness, results and impacts on the teenagers. It may be more efficient to ask for an "expert evaluation" building upon existing knowledge and figures.

The evaluation should associate specialised expertises in the fields of public health, social marketing, media communication, with accurate evaluation methodologies, in order to weight and summarize the whole information, and to build cost-effective and realistic recommendations.

The topics covered might focus mainly on the "left side" of the logical framework (2.1.1 above):

- Compliance of the campaign with the existing knowledge and literature, regarding the media strategy as well as the content of the messages;
- Check, re-analyse, summarize and try to consolidate the figures regarding:
 - ❖ The media performance of the campaign (reach, frequency ... on the target),
 - ❖ The attendance to local youth and PR events,
 - ❖ The leverage impact of the campaign on media: the extent and audience of the editorial coverage of the campaign.
- Gather and analyse any available figures regarding awareness: but, without any specific survey, it will not be possible to have reliable figures regarding awareness.
- Investigate the perception of the message, the agreement, the reactions of young people: a qualitative approach may be affordable once again; moreover, we insisted (3.1) on the pre-tests to be carried out: they will provide useful material for the evaluators.
- Analyse the management of the campaign, the quality of decision-making processes and of the implementation, the ability of the EC and MC to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities and to overcome risks or threats.

Information-sharing meetings may proceed during the evaluation, inside the Expert Panel and the National Focal Points, or with external institutions, from countries where larger budgets are invested on tobacco prevention.

As a matter of fact, evaluation reports covering these topics can answer many questions and support strongly the action of the Commission. Even if they will not say how many young people have received the message, how many smokers have stopped smoking or intend to, and all "results" items alike.

3.3.3.2 Alternative option: media expertise commissioned by the DG SANCO apart from the evaluation

Some of the tasks described above (3.3.3.1) could be fulfilled apart from the evaluation, whatever the kind of evaluation (quantitative survey or expert review), and within a different timeframe: preferably during the campaign itself, rather than ex post.



These specific tasks cover the media expertise issues:

- **Audit of the figures** presented by MC to the Commission: are the figures meaningful, are the consolidations well-founded, what conclusions can be drawn from these figures;
- **Quality review of the professional process** at MC: does the management of the campaign at MC comply with professional standards? Are the media planning choices efficient with respect to the costs (are the decisions regarding the magazines well-founded...)? Are the costs of the website in line with professional standard, compared to the number of pages and numbers of hits? And so on.

As far as the EC considers carrying out another media campaign after 2004, cost-efficiency will be at stake, and such an audit would be a useful source of information to prepare the call for tenders covering the next media campaign.

4. CONSISTENCE AND RELEVANCE OF THE CAMPAIGN'S LOGICAL FRAMEWORK: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

4.1 Summary

- Based upon a preliminary analysis of the underlying rationale or “logic” of the “Feel Free” campaign, taking into account the available evidence, the campaign seems to be in the right direction and largely consistent with lessons learned from experiences in other jurisdictions and the literature. This preliminary conclusion may be modified based upon what we will learn in our subsequent data collection.
- Nevertheless, it should be noted that without greatly increased resources, the impact of the campaign is likely to be very modest at best, and in any case will require significant time to be manifested. Furthermore, the impact of the campaign will not take place in isolation, but as one contributing factor, and can be enhanced with more coordinated activities at the EU level, with Member States, NGOs and other partners. Indeed, the campaign may have more potential to create change at the societal level and among other players that directly at the individual level. There appears to be potential for greater coordination among various partners involved in the anti-tobacco movement, and in generating public and political support at all levels for increased tobacco control activities.

4.2 Introduction

4.2.1 Objective and purpose

This part 4 of the evaluation report presents evalua’s analysis of the consistency of the programme “theory” or “logic” of the Commission’s anti-tobacco youth campaign (“Feel Free to Say No”), analysis based on a review of literature.

- I.e. it examines the implicit and explicit assumptions about how the campaign is expected to “work”, and the consistency of the campaign approach with available information from the literature and other sources about what seems to make for effective campaigns of this form.

4.2.2 Information sources

This review is based upon the following sources of information:

- A review of applicable literature, in particular existing reviews or summaries about the impact of tobacco campaigns and messages aimed at adolescents, as well as other applicable literature.
- Various Commission documents related to the campaign.
- The proposal of Media Consulta, as well as other information about the campaign and its background, including campaign materials in various media.

- An initial meeting with the Evaluation Steering Committee (DG SANCO staff, as well as representatives of the Panel of Experts and the Scientific Advisory Committee).
- Participation/observation at the December 2002 partners' meeting in Luxemburg.
- Initial discussions with DG SANCO staff, partners and Media Consulta staff.
- Our own knowledge and experience based upon previous work in the area.

(See below for a list of documents consulted).

We have discovered a considerable amount of recent literature and information, in particular some very useful comparative reviews. There are some differences within the literature. Nevertheless, a generally consistent picture has emerged, at least about many of the key factors that need to be taken into consideration when attempting to alter the attitudes and smoking behaviour of youth through communications.

4.2.3 Limitations

- This analysis is in nature prior to our own data collection: the conclusions of the literature do not include our own findings (next parts of this report).
- Given scope and mandate of this project, this is not intended to represent a comprehensive literature review.

4.3 The Youth-Focused Communications Approach

4.3.1 Rationale for a campaign aimed at smoking by youth

The literature and available evidence provides a compelling rationale for the need for action to combat smoking by youth, e.g.:

- Smoking rates among youth are high, and are either stable or increasing in most parts of the EU, as well as in other jurisdictions around the world. E.g. as the report of the recent WHO European Minister's Conference states:

"Among youth people, smoking is a well established behaviour showing almost no signs of a decrease.... Since 1997 no Member State has shown a significant decrease in smoking prevalence among its young population."

- More than 80 percent of European smokers first began to smoke during adolescence. Corbett observes that: *"Susceptibility to tobacco use begins early in life. ...For most smokers, tobacco dependence begins in childhood or adolescence."*

There are suggestions in the literature that heading off initiation of smoking during youth could represent a highly effective way of reducing overall smoking behaviour. E.g. the US Surgeon General observed:

"Nearly all first use of tobacco occurs before high school graduation; this finding suggests that if adolescents can be kept tobacco-free, most will never start using tobacco."

- WHO data suggest that European youth are starting to smoke at an even earlier age.
- Adolescents by definition are in their formative years, when behavioural patterns for later years are established. This is especially applicable given the highly addictive nature of tobacco.
- A youth focus provides an opportunity to emphasise prevention, among non-smokers and "experimenters"; preventative action when possible is considered preferable than waiting for a health problem to develop.
- Smoking is associated with other risky health/lifestyle behaviours (e.g. other drug use, limited physical activity, poor nutrition) that often get formed during adolescence.
- Given the wide range of health problems associated with smoking, and the cumulative effects that are related to the extent of smoking, it makes sense to address this issue as soon as possible.

Partly as a result of the above and related evidence, there is strong support for action to combat youth smoking, e.g. the following statement by the Framework Alliance on Tobacco Control:

Our children are the future customers and victims of tobacco. (...) Their hope is that governments will do the right thing so that those who are enslaved by tobacco addiction and manipulated by industry advertising will not suffer a premature and painful death from tobacco.

Similarly, the CDC Best Practices report identifies as a primary goal of comprehensive tobacco control programmes: "preventing the initiation of tobacco use among young people," and also promoting quitting among young people as well as adults.

Nevertheless, **there is a strong consensus in the literature about the difficulties of reaching youth, that they are a very challenging audience to influence**, and that one needs to proceed very carefully (if at all, in some cases).

- The WHO/Schar & Gutierrez review indicates that: *"Targeting youth is a special challenge and must be carefully considered"*, noting that youth are particularly resistant to health messages, with a danger of messages and strategies backfiring.
- Youth are very media savvy (e.g. Mask, 2002b) and will "tune out" or even rebel and do the opposite of what is desired if they do not find anti-smoking messages to be relevant and credible to them.

- Programmes to date targeted at adolescents have met with, at best, mixed success, without a good record of sustainability (e.g. Corbett, Wakefield and Chaloupka, Schar and Gutierrez). There are no clear or easy answers about how to influence youth smoking behaviours, especially through media, with a significant danger of perverse effects.
- Despite all the research, “there is a lack of published research on effective interventions for smoking cessation in young people”, including how best to design messages and campaigns, especially those targeted at youth (e.g. Health Evidence Bulletins Wales [source of the above quote], Worden). The literature contains exhortations for more research and evaluation in this area.
- As Friend and Levy suggest, the mixed results of various campaigns and research studies could be a result of differences in the scale and duration of expenditures, the content of ad messages, and the existence and implementation of other tobacco policies.
- For the above reasons, some commentators seem to be ambivalent about a youth focus. As Schar, Gutierrez, and Murphy indicate: “Targeting youth directly as a smoking prevention audience is a subject of great debate in the tobacco control community.”
- But as identified earlier, given the need and potential opportunities, there is overall strong support for addressing youth smoking.
- Given the nature of the youth smoking epidemic, it would seem irresponsible to ignore this. It would seem appropriate to take at least some action in this respect, with a strong learning focus in order to guide future actions.

The above does not mean that a youth focus is the only possible choice for a European anti-smoking campaign. But some choice is essential (see discussion below), and the rationale for targeting youth appears compelling.

4.3.2 The importance of targeting

A targeted approach to communications is absolutely essential.

- “One size fits all fits none” – campaign strategies and messages must be tailored to very specific audiences/segments, otherwise impact is unlikely.
- Messages suitable for some audience segments can be taken very differently, sometimes with perverse consequences, by others (e.g. risk-takers vs. safety seekers; males vs. females; youth vs. adults).
- Few programmes or interventions of any form are effective for the whole of the population, they always depend on context.

Without careful targeting, with messages aimed at the target audiences that are well researched, there is a danger of preaching to the converted, and/or to the hardcore who are unlikely to be moved irrespective of what is done, in either case with either minimal or even negative impact.

Targeting is especially critical with limited budget for communications, as in the case of the “Feel Free” campaign.

In general, the “Feel Free” campaign appears to be carefully and realistically targeted: it is aimed at adolescents who are non-smokers or “experimenters”.

Nevertheless, it is possible that this segment may still be too broad (while recognising practical limitations of restricting the target audience any further).

Media Consulta, in its proposal, also noted that this target group is very diverse.

- The literature suggests targeting on “at risk” youths: it is unclear the extent to which “Feel Free” is doing this.
 - ❖ E.g. the “Wider Public Health Report” (Cochrane and Campbell Collaboration) says that targeting information on high-risk groups, based upon a knowledge of differences in smoking patterns across various population groups, is likely to be more effective than broad-scale approaches.
- Psychographic factors (e.g. differences along attitudinal or behavioural characteristics) may be at least as important as demographic variables.
- In particular, there are significant differences between boys vs. girls, e.g.:
 - ❖ There are somewhat different demographics: generally, there are higher levels of smoking by adolescent girls than boys in the EU, in other jurisdictions teenage girls have been the least responsive of all age segments to anti-smoking messages to date (e.g. smoking among adolescent girls has either remained constant or risen, even when declining in the rest of the population).
 - ❖ There are different factors influencing girls from boys in smoking.
- The above considerations are discussed in the Media Consulta proposal and seem to be at least implicitly recognised in the Feel Free campaign, e.g. using somewhat different media to reach girls and with the plan for next [2003] phase of the campaign to concentrate more on girls.
- It is possible to focus on both boys and girls, recognising that somewhat different approaches may be required; but with a limited budget, there is a risk of spreading available resources already too thin.

Some (but not all) of the literature warns against inappropriate targeting:

- Target audiences may not self identify with how social marketers view them (e.g. Schar and Gutierrez indicate that people do not necessarily self identify as people interesting in quitting smoking, and that their own perceptions of this can change from day to day).
- Multiple messages to reach different audiences, as well as messages that can “work” for more than one target group, are sometimes advised. E.g. Schar, Gutierrez, and Murphy indicate that: *“Programs with resources to develop specific youth messages in addition to general population messages may achieve increased effectiveness and reduced uptake.”*

- But as just suggested, approaching multiple audiences requires an extensive budget, which does not apply to the “Feel Free” campaign.
- Given the mixed record of success in reaching adolescents, it would appear important to target as carefully as possible.

4.3.3 Need for use of campaign messages credible and relevant to youth

The literature on anti-smoking campaigns, as well as on health promotion and more generally on communication, indicates that messages to be effective must reach the target audience (i.e. youth) where it is, not where we want it to be.

The research suggests that effective campaigns counteract social influences favouring tobacco use, or the “culture” currently considering smoking as acceptable and desirable (e.g. Corbett, Klein, Pentz).

Mask succinctly articulates the three key characteristics of effective messages for youth (these are constant themes in the literature):

- ❖ Credibility – from the youth’s perspective (e.g. saying “cool kids don’t smoke” is not credible).
- ❖ Relevance – in terms of the youth’s perceived world, vs. actual world. Understanding psychographics conditions and mindset are critical to establish relevance.
- ❖ Inescapable truths – “short, impactful statements ... which the audience cannot rationally dismiss out of hand (e.g. ‘smoking causes lung cancer’),”.

According to a recent major study by Pechmann et al., (the lead article in a recent issue of the *Journal of Marketing*) one of the few studies comparing the effectiveness of alternative forms of anti-smoking messages, **the only messages that are effective in increasing adolescents’ non-smoking intentions are those that enhance the perception smoking can result in social disapproval.** “Truth” messages emphasising the manipulative approaches of the tobacco industry, or health risks, were not effective. However, messages that can succeed in making adolescents realise they are indeed vulnerable to health risks (vs. those emphasising severity) can work.

The “appeal” of fear appeals: Is this supported by the evidence?

There is considerable interest in the use of “fear” or “shock” approaches, i.e. emphasising that smoking will lead to death. But is this approach likely to be effective with youth?

The evidence suggests that at best, fear appeals should be used with extreme caution.

- One of the most extensive reviews of fear appeals in health promotion (Ruiter, Abrahams, and Kok) indicates that: “*The contribution of fear appeals to the adoption of self-protective behaviour is in doubt. ... It is the precautionary information or reassurance included in the message, not the capacity to arouse fear, that is likely to have great impact on behaviour.*” Fear appeals can be effective in selective situations, but *only* if it is clear to recipients of the message what action they need to take and if they feel fully capable of taking such action (self efficacy). Otherwise, fear appeals conversely can result in more rather than less of the undesired behaviour. The review concludes:

"Cautious use of fear arousal techniques seems advisable. A greater focus on precautionary information and the promotion of action at the expense of prompting fear arousal is likely to be more consistently effective than attempts to frighten people about health risks with images of death and injury. Campaigns should continue to highlight the personal relevance of health threats but the severity of outcomes following health-risk behaviour may be much less important to establish than the feasibility of preventive action."

- The Pechmann study comparing different types of messages, found that the fear approach can lead to an increase, rather than a decrease, in smoking:

"Among youth who felt immune to health risks (most adolescents), higher perceived health risk severity was associated with stronger intentions to smoke. ... Stressing the severity of long-term health risks does not appear to be an effective strategy; in fact, doing so could enhance smoking's forbidden fruit allure."

Despite consistent evidence in the health promotion literature, regarding the limitations of fear appeals, there have been recent campaigns (most notably the Florida "truth" campaign, but also some other graphic campaigns, e.g. in Australia) that claim at least some degree of success (e.g. see Schar, Gutierrez, and Murphy review of youth media campaigns). How can one reconcile these competing perspectives? White, Tan, Wakefield and Hill, as part of a discussion of recent Australian work in this area, consider some of the apparent contradictions in the literature and indicate:

"Recent work from the United States suggests that although these types of advertisements (high fear messages) might be popular with adolescents, their efficacy in reducing adolescent smoking intentions and behaviours is unclear."

"In general, these studies have found that the use of high threat or fear appeals had little impact on adolescents' sense of vulnerability or their likelihood of adopting the recommended behaviours."

"However, recent work is suggesting that fear appeals are effective and can work with adolescents as long as they are accompanied by a message that suggests an effective response."

"However, the study [Henley and Donovan] also found that the most effective messages for all age groups, and for males and females, were those using a non-death disablement appeal."

White et al., noting inconsistencies in the literature, conclude:

"Differences in the conclusions about the effectiveness of high fear appeal advertisements in reducing smoking among adolescents need to be investigated."

The article suggests that differing findings could relate to the quality of the actual advertisements, and/or the context in which they are viewed (e.g. as part of a campaign or not).

To this could be added research quality. E.g. The quality and conclusions of some of the research in support of fear appeals has been questioned by others. Schar, Gutierrez, and Murphy further add:

"No single recipe appears as the definitive approach. ... Inconsistent findings may be due to the difference in methodologies and the reality that advertising messages do not appear in a vacuum, and are affected by creative executional factors, exposure, message wearout and audience sophistication."

Schar, Gutierrez, and Murphy further emphasize that there is no good information about which strategies work and under what situations. As they say in their Lessons Learned review of youth tobacco use prevention media campaigns:

"The findings and recommendations presented in this review should be considered preliminary and directional, not precise or definitive. They will gain greater clarity and reliability as more data from evaluated campaigns become available. As states, national organizations and countries develop their own campaigns, they will need to qualify campaign elements that they believe will work most effectively with their unique target audiences and environment, using their own qualitative and quantitative research, and also taking into account learnings from other campaigns compiled and shared in reviews."

4.3.4 Assessment of the "Feel Free" communications strategy

The logic of the overall campaign strategy appears consistent with what is known from the literature and experiences elsewhere, about how to reach youth with an anti-smoking message:

- E.g. the use of role models (football players, pop music stars) who are credible to youth, use of peers, being "cool", stressing how not smoking can make one attractive to others (especially the opposite sex).
- Potentially one might consider doing a bit more regarding some of the reasons why girls in particular smoke (e.g. appearance, weight control, attractiveness, friends who smoke) – although the B4-4 campaign song does appear to address this.

Thus based upon what we have seen to date, the overall strategy of the "Feel Free" campaign seems consistent with the state-of-the-art. But the literature emphasizes that the key to success, especially with youth, depends very much upon the specific approach undertaken and developed and how this precisely is implemented. Thus whether or not the "Feel Free" campaign is actually effective remains an empirical question, e.g. what messages are actually perceived by youth and how they react to these. These will be explored in the qualitative research (see below).

4.3.5 Impact of the campaign likely to be very modest


The literature (including a number of comprehensive comparative reviews) and experiences elsewhere suggest that media can be effective. But:

- Results to date have been mixed, suggesting that media of sufficient scale and duration can affect smoking rates, but it depends very much on how a campaign is approached and implemented (e.g. Lantz et al., Levy and Friend).
- A consistent finding in the literature with respect to youth-oriented anti-smoking campaigns is that to have chance of impact, an “aggressive” approach is required, (i.e. with high levels of prolonged exposure). E.g. a review by Wakefield and Chaloupka concluded that: *“One of the most critical factors in programme success is the extent of programme funding, and consequent level of programme implementation.”* Biener, for example, emphasises the need for high levels of exposure in order to achieve reductions in smoking among adolescents. The Schar and Gutierrez WHO review similarly states that:

“Media weight (reach and frequency) and campaign duration are crucial elements to insure a continued decline in smoking rates.”

- A dynamic vs. static campaign seems to work best, i.e. with variations in messages over time (but with sufficient high-level exposure to achieve significant awareness).
- Time is required, especially for measurable and sustainable behaviour change. E.g. as Klein has observed: *“Campaigns have to build momentum and support, and both campaign staff and evaluators need to remember that that takes time.”*
- Communication campaigns generally are most effective where they represent just one element, taking place in combination with a range of other policies, strategies and “on the ground” programmes and interventions. Indeed, the literature suggests that stand-alone campaigns are not likely to be effective.

Following is a simplified model of how a campaign might be expected to “work” in affecting individuals²²:



²² According to psycho-sociological literature, behavioural intentions related to a specific actions are by far better indicators of behaviours, than attitudes. And attitudes tend to follow the behaviours, rather than precede them.

(Cumulated) reach : number of people reached by the spot. (Individual) Exposure : how many times each of these persons has been reached.

Awareness of a message, let alone a favourable reaction or change in attitudes or behaviour, requires multiple repetitions – even assuming that everything else is perfect (i.e. the best possible message, well targeted and convincing). There is considerable “noise” (multiple messages in the media) that can make awareness of a particular campaign and its messages challenging, without sufficient exposure. Furthermore, as Henry has observed: *“People have relied too much on awareness as an outcome and not considered salience or the extent to which the target audience member members are personally concerned with an issue.”*

Resources devoted to the “Feel Free” campaign are very limited, especially for a pan-European campaign, even though Media Consulta has got substantial donated media time and media exposure for its various events, and though the use of B4-4 might have resulted, in case of commercial success of the group, in substantial unpaid additional publicity, etc.

The available resources for the campaign are likely too limited to be able to produce more than limited awareness at best. Even if the communications works as intended, it would be unrealistic to expect major change, including measurable change in smoking behaviour (or even in attitudes or behavioural intention) in the youth population at large.

There may have been some unrealistic expectations - among some NGOs, perhaps within the Commission as well - about what this campaign can be expected to achieve. The campaign should be evaluated with regard to realistic expectations for what it can accomplish.

- ❖ E.g. the campaign in its first year potentially might be able to create some initial awareness, and in particular good learning about which types of media approaches are most likely to be effective in the future. Thus it could set the stage for increased impact in future years.
- ❖ The above analysis applies to the direct effects of the communication on individual youth targeted. In addition, there is the potential for leverage, e.g. influencing partners and others to take more extensive complementary action to combat tobacco use, that potentially could have greater impact than the communications campaign itself. These considerations are discussed in part below.

4.4 Complementarity of the Overall Campaign Strategy with Other Interventions and Forms of Influence

4.4.1 Effective campaigns are part of a comprehensive, coordinated tobacco control strategy

The international literature states unanimously that media campaigns are only effective when they are one component of a comprehensive tobacco control strategy, and as Lantz et al. have identified, *“especially if conducted in a coordinated way to take advantage of potential synergies across interventions.”* As Henry and Wakefield & Chaloupka, for example, have indicated, complementary “air” (media) and “ground” (community based) activities are needed. Stand-alone campaigns are unlikely to have much of an effect. These conclusions are supported in particular by a variety of reviews that have looked across a variety of interventions.

For example, the WHO European Minister’s Conference for A Tobacco-Free Europe (Review of implementation of the Third Action Plan for a Tobacco-free Europe 1997-2001) indicated that:

“A multisectoral and comprehensive approach is the cornerstone of effective national tobacco control programmes. Good coordination is thus a strategic issue for their implementation.”

The Schar and Gutierrez WHO review identifying lessons learned from smoking cessation media campaigns from around the world states:

“Evidence suggests that media campaigns are most effective at eliciting smoking cessation when they are a part of a comprehensive program of interventions. It has been recognized that ‘Changes in media have been associated with major changes in smoking behavior, but only when the rest of the social structure actively changes the environment for the smoker.’ ”

A review of the international literature by Willemsen and De Zwart concluded that:

“Isolated measures produce little effect. Most effect may be expected from a combination of a complete ban on tobacco advertising, increasing prices, restricting tobacco product sales to tobacconists, mass media education aimed at youth and intensifying school education.”

The comprehensive review by Lantz et al. of approaches aimed at reducing youth smoking found that a combination of aggressive media campaigns, teen smoking cessation programmes, social environment changes, community interventions, and increasing cigarette prices, is likely to be most promising. Pentz’s review similarly found that: *“multi-component community programs that have a school program as a basis, with supportive parent, media, and community organizational components, have shown the most sustained effects on tobacco use.”* Vartiainen et al.’s fifteen-year follow-up in the North Karelia (Finland) project concluded that: *“Long-term smoking prevention effects can be achieved if a school-based program using a social influence model is combined with community and mass media interventions.”*

A comprehensive approach as discussed above also can be described as social change, social ecological, cultural, or systems models of influence.

However labelled, some overall implications include:

- It is the overall complex of activities that will influence smoking attitudes and behaviours more than any single element in itself.
- Communications will be most effective when it complements and supports other forms of interventions, and when the same basic message is reinforced in somewhat different ways from different sources.
- Evaluation of the campaign needs to take the above into account, using some form of a systems approach that recognises that impact of a media campaign will interact with a number of other factors.

4.4.2 An integrated communications approach

A basic communications principle is that multiple messages, in multiple media and formats, is more likely to be effective than just a single approach.

The Schar and Gutierrez WHO review speaks of “multi-layered marketing pro-grams.” It says that:

“Effective cessation programs reach smokers with antismoking information in many ways. ... Successful smoking cessation programs have found ways to surround the audience with cessation messages that, when layered together, maximize impact. Marketing vehicles include television, radio, print (newspaper and magazine), billboards, direct mail, publicity and news coverage, and cessation events, supported by community health services and education programs such as telephone helplines.”

Communications is also likely to be most effective when part of a social marketing approach. A basic principle of social marketing is to learn as much as possible about the target audience, and to adjust the entire communications approach accordingly.

4.4.3 De-normalisation of smoking as part of the culture is the goal

A major conclusion of the Schar and Gutierrez WHO review and supported by other research is that cessation messages are most effective as part of a de-normalisation strategy, to change the culture related to tobacco use.

- ❖ As they indicate, effective strategies directly and indirectly communicate the message “*that smoking is not normal, not harmless, and not desirable.*”
- ❖ A wide range of strategies in combination, such as suggested above, including media but especially policy and environmental interventions, need to aim to create a societal context in which smoking has become a much less accepted practice.

Thus culture becomes the overriding issue. The evidence clearly indicates that when there is a culture where smoking is frowned upon, when those who smoke are subject to social disapproval, then there will be less smoking behaviour.

- ❖ E.g. this very much represents the situation in Canada and the US, where de-normalising smoking from an accepted behaviour to practically a deviant one led to major reductions in smoking rates.
- ❖ An anti-smoking culture is affected by multiple activities and players, both directly connected with public health and not, intended and not.
- ❖ In fact, formal health communications represents just one part, and not necessarily the most important part, of the complex of activities that will lead to change in smoking attitudes and behaviour. E.g. an increasing number of “no smoking” signs in offices, taxis, private offices, etc. all help to reinforce the message that smoking is not welcomed or viewed as acceptable behaviour.
- ❖ Images in everyday culture (e.g. the behaviour of credible public figures), smoking behaviour of friends, etc. also play a major role in creating a culture that accepts or rejects smoking as “normal” behaviour.
- ❖ Various anti-smoking policies and actions within the EU at various levels, can also serve to give “signals” that smoking is unacceptable, e.g.:
 - Recent EU legislation restricting tobacco advertising and sponsorship.
 - Smoking bans or restrictions (e.g. airports, trains, restaurants/bars, other public places).
 - Increases in the price of cigarettes.
 - Restrictions on sales to youth.

The above information has important implications for the role of media. Corbett, for example, suggests that:

“Upstream action at the community or population level ... is likely to have a larger, systemic effect for the prevention dollar than ‘down-stream’ approaches directed at specific individuals.”

As the CDC Best Practices report says:

Media “can have a powerful influence on public support ... and set a supportive climate for school and community efforts.”

Similarly, Corbett indicates that media *“has the power to set agendas for public debate and call politicians to accountability regarding tobacco.”* Weiss has also indicated that a media campaign can play a major role in activating others to take action.

In other words, the value of media can be as much, or more, in mobilising support for tobacco control among the public and politicians as in directly attempting to change individual behaviour. Media potentially can assist in making possible environmental changes and other interventions, such as smoking bans in public places, which collectively can change the culture regarding the acceptability of smoking. Thus interim outcomes of a media campaign can be as mobilisation of support as much as – or more – than direct attitude or behaviour change.

- ❖ This suggests that the Feel Free campaign may, ultimately, have a greater effect through influencing others (both public health and non public health) to play a greater role in the anti-smoking area than through its very specific communications objectives.

Given the importance of comprehensive, coordinated approaches, another key consideration for a media campaign is its degree of success in engaging key partners, those who are or could be active in some way in attempting to reduce tobacco use, particularly among youth. The evidence is clear: engagement and buy-in comes from involvement, where various partners participate jointly.

Similarly, it is important to involve youth in designing interventions, including communication campaigns.

- ❖ As Corbett says:

"Youth should be brought into the formative phase of design or interventions, and consulted regarding implementation of strategies. Youth may also be engaged, to their own advantage as well as that of tobacco control efforts, as representatives and spokespersons for tobacco issues."

- ❖ Health Canada indicates:

"Meaningful youth engagement produces benefits not only to youth and to their communities, but also to the organizations and 'systems' that work to engage them. Health Canada knows that youth involvement is key to developing strategies that help young people remain or become smoke-free."

4.4.4 Consistency of the "Feel Free" campaign with the above considerations

4.4.4.1 General

The design of the campaign does seem to recognise, at least implicitly, the importance of a comprehensive approach.

In particular, the Media Consulta communications strategy is very much an integrated strategy, involving both different forms of communications and different media, e.g.:

- Advertising in different media (TV, soon print, radio perhaps later on, cinemas).
- Various forms of public relations activities.
- At least some interactive communications (e.g. the Feel Free website).
- A variety of events, with a number staged in the first two waves of the campaign, and the travelling road show in 2003, with synergies planned (or at least on offer) with local events in Member States.

A concern, as expressed earlier, is how much impact is likely, given the limited budget and the consequent episodic nature of the campaign. Nevertheless, the approach does seem designed in a number of respects to make the very most of a very limited budget and appears consistent with a social change model as suggested in the literature.

The campaign strategy also appears to involve a number of tactics for influencing the mass media and popular culture directly.

- For example, as suggested above, there appears to be significant contacts with various media in order to attempt to secure more editorial attention to the smoking issue, particularly among youth.



- The involvement of B4-4 in the campaign appears to be an intriguing way to get the anti-smoking message directly to the popular culture, as least for youth. This is an unusual approach, and seemingly an interesting gamble. The Canadian group is unknown in Europe at the time of the campaign (2002) and plans to get audience via a single that is also the theme song of the “Feel Free” campaign; at the very least this provides complementary coverage, which can help enhance awareness of other elements of the campaign, and can help provide for entries into increased editorial coverage of the smoking issue. If, as Media Consulta hoped, this single did hit the charts, this could be a major coup, providing publicity and awareness, both for the anti-smoking message in general and for the “Feel Free” campaign in particular, that one cannot buy at any price.
 - It is not clear (at the beginning of 2003) how the target group will react in fact to B4-4. This group may be most popular with young girls²³.

The EU is engaged in other complementary strategies to discourage smoking (e.g. the forthcoming ban on tobacco advertising and sponsorship); similar action is happening in a number of Member States.

Nevertheless, there does not appear to be an articulated vision or comprehensive strategy, e.g. indicating the full range of tobacco control activities and where the communications campaign is expected to fit in, at a Commission/EU level, or with individual Member States. The literature and experiences from elsewhere suggest that this can reduce the potential for synergies and for enhanced impact of the campaign. In fact, the campaign does not appear to be well connected, at least on a systematic basis,

²³ As a matter of fact, both the release and the market performance of the single and the album have been lower than these expectations. The single has been released only in Germany, at spring 2003, and not in all Member States as foreseen. Despite the benefit from the campaign coverage, the single has remained shortly in the German Top 40, the highest rank being the first week's one (rank 8). We nevertheless consider, in the present analysis of the logical framework for the evaluation of the 2002 campaign, that the gamble was meaningful.

with other forms of anti-smoking interventions. This potentially represents a major factor that can limit the impact of the campaign.

4.4.4.2 Relationship of the Campaign with activities of national governments, NGOs, and other partners

A key objective of the overall campaign is to coordinate efforts with other partners (including national public health authorities, NGOs, other natural intermediaries for the target audiences, and the media), with the intention of blending smoothly with the most relevant national events. One of the stated objectives of the evaluation is to assess the role of all contributors to the campaign.

The coordination objective is identified, indeed emphasised and elaborated upon, in Media Consulta's proposal. Nevertheless, coordination of the campaign with activities of partners appears to be mentioned rather as a principle than as a detailed strategy, or as a plan involving the various partners.

There has been, until the release of the 1st campaign flight (included), few discussions with potential partners about the campaign and the potential for joint involvement.

The situation has changed, from the autumn of 2002 onwards (see part 7), but the coordination has developed merely around the content and implementation of the campaign, than around comprehensive European or national tobacco control strategies.

The evaluation has to take into account the realities involved in launching a campaign of this nature and the time it takes to develop effective partnership relationships, especially on a pan-European basis.

4.5 Implications of the analysis of the campaign's logical framework

As mentioned above, these conclusions are preliminary in nature²⁴. They are based upon our analysis of the logical coherence of the campaign strategy and its consistency with what is known from the literature and from experiences of other campaigns and tobacco control strategies.

4.5.1 Implications for the Campaign and for DG SANCO

In general, the campaign logic appears coherent and consistent with the literature and the experiences of other campaigns in a variety of different jurisdictions. The strategy seems well thought out and designed to get the best of a very limited budget.

Nevertheless, one needs to be realistic and modest about what this campaign can be expected to achieve, given both its very limited budget, the limitations of stand-alone communications, and the time required for even the most effective approaches to make an impact in a challenging area.

- Thus DG SANCO should be clear itself about what is realistic to expect from the campaign, especially in the short term. It also may be appropriate for it to

²⁴ The interim report on the logical framework exposes more comprehensive implications.

try to manage the expectations of other key stakeholders, both internal and external to the Commission.

Even if all goes as best as can be hoped, with current budget levels only limited impact at best can be expected.

4.5.2 Implications for Evaluation

The current evaluation project consists of two major components:

- ❖ A formative aspect, to carry out a preliminary evaluation of work to date on the campaign, identifying in particular its potential for later impact and providing guidance for fine tuning and, if applicable, redirection of activities.
- ❖ Developing a design and tools for evaluation of future stages of the campaign.

4.5.2.1 The present formative evaluation

The design of the present formative evaluation still seems appropriate, taking into account this review of the literature.

- ❖ Within the focus groups, most attention should be paid to the social interactions between the teenagers, their emotional reactions to the campaign, the differences between boys and girls ;
- ❖ The key informant interviews should put a bit more emphasis than foreseen, on what could facilitate increased coordination and synergies with partners.
- ❖ This can happen through review of documents and mainly through our key informant interviews (Step B, simultaneously with the focus groups).
- ❖ The review and analysis of data on exposure, reach, and potentially on awareness that Media Consulta has available, should help in assessing what could be realistic or not to expect in terms of awareness.

The participative approach to the evaluation, as indicated in the Evalua proposal and presented at the December 2002 partners' meeting in Luxembourg, seems particularly relevant.

It is also important to be realistic about what level of outcomes the evaluation would be in a position to demonstrate during its current time frame, given the status of the campaign and the time required for any significant impact to be manifested. It should be possible to demonstrate the potential of the campaign to make an impact, and what could be done to strengthen this. It will be premature, however, to be able to establish any significant change in attitudes or behaviour among the general population.

4.5.2.2 Considerations re subsequent (global) evaluation

While somewhat mixed, the literature in general suggests that evaluation of anti-smoking media campaigns should:

- Be "extensive", representing a considered effort, with a significant research/evaluation component to help in designing and modifying the approach to the campaign on an ongoing basis.



- Take a dynamic and supportive rather than a static approach in order to be most useful (i.e. predetermined research designs would be inappropriate), as effective campaign approaches themselves should evolve in response to opportunities and evaluation feedback. The focus of evaluation should be at least as much on identifying the reasons for what has or has not taken place, and implications for future actions, as on ascertaining impact (e.g. Klein, Sutton).
- Involve a mix of both qualitative and quantitative methods.
- Recognise that (e.g. as Corbett puts it): *"Clear effects are difficult to demonstrate."*
 - ❖ Much of the influence of the campaign can be expected to happen indirectly, e.g. via stimulating, supporting and complementing the actions of others: that exact attribution of impact will be difficult or impossible. But it should be possible to develop an evaluation model that can at least identify the ways in which a campaign can influence what transpires.

Given the mixed success to date of other campaigns in reaching youth and the lack of solid research about how best to do this, **the role of research and evaluation in the Commission campaign would seem especially important.**

- In addition to providing feedback on the impact of the Commission's own campaign, this research could potentially represent a significant outcome in itself, by identifying learnings from research/evaluation about how best to influence smoking among youth, that could be shared with partners and others engaged in the same area.

Given the evidence that communication campaigns are effective only in interaction with other tobacco control efforts and societal influences, it would be appropriate for future evaluation to consider the complementarity of the campaign with other initiatives at the European and national levels.

- More emphasis may be needed in future evaluation on the interactive and indirect impacts of the campaign, even more than attempting to look at direct impact on teenagers.
- A systems approach of some form would appear appropriate. It may be appropriate to consider some form of network analysis, to look at the network of relationships and influencing factors.

4.6 Annex - References and Documents Reviewed

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


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5. RE-ANALYSES OF THE AUDIENCE FIGURES

5.1 Aim: to check the efficiency regarding the « media » part of the logical framework; and limitations

The present part of the evaluation - "Re-analyses of the audience figures" relates to the "professional media process" as opposed to the "psycho-sociological process", i.e. with the left part of the scheme below, as opposed to the right part. In order to have an impact, the message has "firstly" to be seen and remarked by the target group (media issue) and "then" to interact favourably with the images previously in the teenagers' minds, with their social relations, with the whole media environment, and so on.



We had supposed that the needed figures to evaluate this part could be provided by MC; including awareness figures, as the perspective of post-tests had been mentioned in the initial bid by the agency. As a matter of fact, almost no awareness data have been collected; MC has nevertheless been able to provide useful figures²⁵ regarding:

- The inputs of the campaign:
 - ❖ Media budgets in €;
 - ❖ Media values in €;
 - ❖ Number of TV spots, of cinema screens ... purchased, by country and channel²⁶.
- The outputs, i.e. the direct *results of the media-planning*:
 - ❖ Number of contacts = the sum of the individual audiences of all spots.
 - This figure is sometimes called « impact », but is not at all an "impact" in the evaluative meaning.
 - This figure is available in all countries for TV, but on targets varying between countries: in Italy, people aged from 8 to 19; in Belgium, from 15 to 34; and so on²⁷.
 - A common unit to communicate this figure is the Gross Rating Point (GRP). A campaign gets 1 GRP as soon as the number of contacts equals 1% of the size of the target group. For example, if a target group counts one million people, and if 2 million contacts have been fulfilled on this target, the number of GRPs is 200.
 - ❖ (Cumulated) reach and frequency (repetition): these figures, computed by national audience measurement institutes, are provided for most TV channels - but are not available for the website²⁸, cinema, and some cable TV channels²⁹.

²⁵ The interim and final reports to the Commission include only very few meaningful figures. Most of the ones we use have been asked directly by evalua to MC.

²⁶ This figure (number of spots...) is quite understandable but also quite meaningless, as it adds prime time spots with spots broadcasted at 4:00 am. The usual measuring units for TV spots are the measured (ex-post) audience, and the "media value", i.e. the sum of the official selling prices of the spots. The price that the agency will really have to pay ("media budget") results from a negotiation with the media; it may be in the range of 60% of the media value.

²⁷ On each media market, a list of "standard targets" has been defined (such as the "housewife under 50" in France and other countries). The age groups used by MC are some of the standard targets. Consistent figures on a same specific target, namely the campaign's pan-European core target, the teenagers from 12 to 18 years, are available in most countries but only on specific request: computing these figures requires a specific data processing by the national audience measurement institutes. The EC and MC have not requested such specific data. As a matter of fact, raw figures on broader targets (8-19 instead of 12-18 ...) are of course larger. That is the reason why our estimate of the number of contacts (see below 5.2), on this 12-18 target, is much weaker than MC's sum of all national scores on the national standard targets.

But MC's figure are official ones (direct computations by the national audience measurement institutes) while our estimates are under our own responsibility.

²⁸ Regarding the website, MC has been able to provide in its reports, numbers of visitors(*) and numbers of pages viewed(*) (MC called them "page impressions"). But one cannot know whether these visitors belong to the target group. Specific data from audience panels would be needed for that.

(*) Definitions and guidelines, for example, on :

- The outcomes, i.e. the direct *results of the campaign*, are not known:
 - ❖ Awareness figures require specific interviews to be fulfilled;
 - ❖ This has been done in Sweden only, with a standard post-test design; while done properly, this post-test does not allow to elaborate conclusions regarding awareness at the European scale.

Before being used in this evaluation, the data provided by MC have been shortly audited by evalua, focusing on TV data, as most of the media budget has been dedicated to TV broadcasting. A random sample of channels and countries has been defined by evalua and the consistency of the figures has been checked on this sample, by comparing the figures provided by the media themselves, and the summaries by MC.

The random sample was the following one:

Country	Flight	Channel
Belgium (Fl)	1	Kanaal 2
Belgium (Fl)	2	JIM TV
Denmark	1	TV2 Zulu
France	1	Fun TV
France	1	M6
Germany	1	Pro 7
Germany	2	Sat 1
Ireland	2	Network 2
Italy	1	Italia 1
Luxemburg	2	Tele Letz.
Netherlands	1	RTL4
Netherlands	2	TMF
UK	1	Channel 4
Pan-Europe	2	MTV spots

After that, we have estimated aggregated (consolidated) figures on the 12-18 target. We have used a basic computation rule, assuming that the audience was homogeneous on the (national standard) youth target, so that the audience on the 12-18 target is supposed to be a simple ratio of the audience on the national youth target³⁰.

Raw figures allowing a similar estimate are not available for the cinema or the website.

www.cio-dpi.gc.ca/ig-gi/e/stats/stats_e.asp?format=print

²⁹ There are no "peplemeters" in Luxemburg: the audience figures for the national TV are therefore only estimates. This problem has no serious incidence on the pan-European sums.

Figures are also partly missing in Greece, where the campaign has been broadcasted at no cost as a public interest one: this free broadcast does not include free audience figures...!

³⁰ For example, in Denmark, the standard target group is 12-20 (9 birth years wide), so 625,000 people, and 1.459 million contacts have been obtained; we assume that the 12-18 group (7 birth years wide) counts $625,000 * (7/9) = 486,000$ teenagers, and that the number of contacts on this group is $1.459 * (7/9) = 1.135$ million. MC's estimate of the GRP is therefore kept, 233 in fact for Denmark ($1,459,000 / 625,000 = 2.33 = 1,135,000 / 486,000$).

5.2 Our estimate: the average teenager in the target has been reached 4.7 times (total for the 2 TV ads)

Our estimates (see estimation method, 5.1 above) are the following for TV:

Channels / countries	Costs (€)	Target	Reach (%)	Contacts 12-18	Cost/conta ct (cents)	Universe (#12-18)	GRP
Eurosport	417 333	14 29	22,1*	16,33	2,6	29,06	56
MTV Europe	477 673	16 34	35,7*	59,65	0,8	29,06	205
Austria	48 840	12 18	42	0,89	5,5	0,64	139
North Belgium	63 000	15 34	26	0,87	7,3	0,54	161
South Belgium	47 000	15 34	42	0,51	9,2	0,39	133
Denmark	97 493	12 20	60	1,13	8,6	0,49	233
Finland	94 419	15 24	72	2,36	4,0	0,46	515
France	377 960	11 24	41	7,57	5,0	5,04	150
Germany	465 947	12 26	36	9,59	4,9	4,35	220
Greece	0	14 29	?	1,92	0,0	0,76	252
Ireland	83 066	15 24	65	1,20	6,9	0,46	262
Italy	378 000	8 19	74	11,97	3,2	4,13	290
Luxembourg	14 000	12 24	37	0,02	56,5	0,04	71
Netherlands	70 000	13 19	60	2,69	2,6	1,25	215
Portugal	112 251	15 24	58	1,82	6,2	1,08	169
Spain	266 000	12 24	75	10,51	2,5	3,99	263
Sweden	101 696	15 34	43	1,61	6,3	0,60	269
UK	325 285	16 24	36	6,12	5,3	4,84	126
E15 (TV)	3 439 963	12 18		136,78	2,5	29,06	471

The first column displays the media budget, according to MC: in 2002, with 3.4 Mn€, TV has been allocated more than 75% of the total media budget of the "Feel free" campaign.

The average European teenager has been exposed, according to our own estimates, to 4.71 times (last column) to the campaign, by the total of the two flights (the one with footballers and the one with pop stars). The total number of contacts on the core target group (12 to 18 years old) is consistently estimated at 136.78 million³¹.

Pan-European TV channels, Eurosport and especially MTV Europe, reach higher GRPs than national TVs for a same cost. MC's claimed partnership with MTV appears as meaningful³². Together, these two channels account for one half of the global number of contacts. Choosing to deal with these media seems adequate for a low-sized TV budget, as the "Feel free" campaign's one.

Nevertheless, the reach (number of people reached at least one) is not very high for these two channels, and is heterogeneous between countries, because it depends on the percentage of cable and satellite subscribers in each country.

³¹ Figures provided by MC are much higher, but relate to the (broader) national standard target groups.

³² Even if the figures are not as reliable for these cable / satellite channels as they are for national TV channels.

As the campaign intended to be homogeneous across Europe, dealing with the national TV channels was logical. But the available budget provided for a limited number of GRPs, in the range of 200, whereas media planners often assume that a repetition around 4 is needed for awareness (the targeted person has to be exposed to the spot around 4 times in order to notice it).

In some countries, where the media space is especially expensive (the UK...), no solution to this problem has been found: only 2% of the British target group has been exposed at this level of repetition. In other countries, meaningful media planning options has been taken, for example in the Netherlands (1st flight), where MC's national partner has bought a very large number of spots with a low unitary audience, ensuring that at least a part of the target audience has been intensively exposed to the campaign, and will therefore be aware of it.

This difference highlights a limit in the "pan-European" design of the campaign: implementing a consistent strategy across countries proves to be a real challenge, as the organisation of media markets is national. But the EC and MC could have done more in this direction, for example by forecasting (and budgeting) the collection of homogenous audience data on the same "12-18" target, and by arbitrating explicitly between the two concurrent objectives of media planning, namely repetition and reach.

5.3 Other media

The broadcast of the "Pop stars" spot on **cinema screens** has used, according to the figures provided by MC, 798,000 € media budget³³.

The simultaneity with the release of the movie "Harry Potter II" was intended to ensure that a higher percentage of the cinema audience within the campaign schedule, belongs to the target group. But regarding advertising in cinemas, it is still not possible to twin spots with specific movies: the same advertising spots are delivered to the spectators of all movies played in the same cinema during a same week. And Harry Potter II targets children rather than teenagers...

At all events, the cinema media is a reasonable choice when teenagers are targeted. In all countries, a significant part of the cinema audience is made up of teenagers.

Regarding the website feel-free.info, MC claims 530,700 visits in 2002 (Final Report); the number of TV contacts is 260 times higher than that figure. In the most favourable hypothesis, i.e. if that all visitors belong to the core target group, that is less than 0.02 visits per European teenager aged 12 to 18. Of course, this may be consistent with the part of the media budget allocated to the website (we did not carry any specific investigations regarding the website).

³³ The figures provided in MC's Final Report 2003 specify a period and numbers of towns and screens. Numbers of spectators, not available at this date, would obviously be more useful, even if these numbers cannot be broken down by age group.
The report mentions an identical period for all countries (14 to 28th of November): that is slightly inaccurate, as the "cinema week" is not the same in all countries.



Moreover, charts by MC show that most of the visits happened during the TV campaigns. As a matter of fact, the content of the website is essentially made up of "public relations" information about the campaign: the website should therefore not be expected to get impact by itself.

Notice that these comments relate to the 2002 website. Many changes have taken place since then!

6. FINDINGS FROM THE FOCUS GROUPS IN THE FIFTEEN MEMBER STATES

6.1 Objectives and methods

6.1.1 Objectives

The objective of the qualitative research was to provide insights on the adequacy and effectiveness of the Feel Free 2002 TV campaign, taking into account the perceptions and motivations of its target audience.

The campaign elements assessed in the qualitative research consisted of 2 TV spots (one with football players, especially intended for the boys, and one with pop music stars, especially intended for the girls, and also broadcasted on cinema screens).



Footballeurs



Pop stars

The claim "Feel free to say no" and the logo have also been tested, but we did not test any specific element of the 2003 campaign.

The facilitation guide, validated by the Commission, explores the understanding, perception and potential impact of the campaign among youth in the 15 Member States; here is a summary of this guide:

Rationale of the campaign:

- How do they understand the message? How clear is the message?
- How far does the campaign/message appear relevant and credible to target audiences?
- What is their understanding and perception of the campaign style (TV spot, logo...)
- How are they reacting to a "pan-European" approach? What does interfere with specific cultural contexts, thus potentially weakening the message?
- Incidentally, how do they react to a campaign by EU initiative?

Emotional force of the campaign:

- To what extent does the campaign captivate its target audience?
- Are the proposed role models (football players, pop music stars) appealing and credible to target audiences?

- Does the “gender” approach work out? What are significant differences in reactions among boys and girls? Are there any potential bridges?

Capacity of the Feel Free campaign to induce behavioural change:

- How much do the target audiences feel concerned with the campaign, its message? Do they identify with the suggested image of people interesting in quitting smoking?
- How much is the campaign persuasive when it comes to quitting smoking?
- What are the different behavioural intentions induced by the campaigns? Incidentally, what are the defensive mechanisms generated by the campaign?

Given the objectives of the present evaluation, the qualitative research could not explore specifically (or extensively) the psycho-sociological background of the youths' inclination towards *smoking*, or their motivations and/or resistances to *quit* smoking. The literature provides relevant and meaningful insights with respect to this issue.

However, it was important to take into account social influences, social norms and viewpoints in shaping pro- and anti-smoking postures when assessing the appeal of Feel Free TV campaign. This was tackled through:

- Identifying how our young respondents view tobacco use, and the social image of smokers and of non smokers in their own culture;
- Relying on local experts to help us understanding better youths' attitudes in their own country regarding smoking.

6.1.2 Methodological framework

The qualitative research took place in the 15 Member States. 2 discussion groups of 4 participants were conducted in each country. In total, 120 girls and boys took part in the research.

The facilitation aimed at establishing a relaxed and yet disciplined atmosphere. Different kind of research/moderation techniques were employed:

- open discussion: youths were invited to express their opinions freely,
- creative tasks (collages) to provide the opportunity for free expression of deeper emotional states and perceptions.

Sample specifications: homogeneity was favoured.

- Homogeneity with respect to gender: separate groups of 4 boys and 4 girls.
- Homogeneity with respect to socio-economic background: “mainstream” socio-economic profile: urban middle-class kids.
- Age: **participants aged 13 to 14.**
 - The following findings pertains only to this precise age group!

- Teenagers having experienced smoking.

Most of the relevant research indicates that smokers and non-smokers are likely to have contrasting views. Given the young age of the target group (13/14) it has been decided to work with teenagers having experimented with cigarettes (at least having tried it). The actual assessment of smoking behaviour among participants was based on their previous statement, hence some discrepancies with the actual behaviour (often unveiled during the group discussion).

Organisation

- Implementing the research

We were assisted with organisation, recruiting and providing venues by a local partner.

The groups took place either in regular professional venues or (when a simultaneous translation was not required) in a conference/meeting room provided by local partner.

The young respondents were compensated financially for participation.

The groups were facilitated by a native speaker with professional experience in group discussions moderation (both with adults and young people). Evalua researchers attended the groups as observers, assisted by simultaneous interpretation as necessary.

- Recruiting procedures

Given local specificities it was too difficult to implement a unique way of recruiting the participants. In practice teenagers were generally invited via data base recruitment (i.e. France), school (i.e. Germany), personal contacts (i.e. Ireland).

It was essential that the participants' parents were informed about the research objectives (anti-tobacco campaign), even though we did not prompt the youth to acknowledge in front of their parents that they are "playing around" with cigarettes.

Because it was assumed that teenage participants would feel more comfortable when accompanied by a friend, the participants were recruited by pairs.

- Location and settings for focus groups

In most countries, the groups took place in a professional venue, allowing simultaneous observation and also translation without interfering with the group discussion. In one country (Ireland), the group took place in a private house.

The materials (two ads) were shown on a computer screen, in the local or international version (when relevant).

In most cases, the group discussions were tape-recorded or video-taped.

6.1.3 Evaluation of the method

- Contribution of the qualitative approach to the evaluation

Use of “mini-groups” permitted thorough discussion with the young respondents, both about the campaign itself and also with respect to views and perspectives related to tobacco.

It is worth recalling that the present research was neither representative nor exhaustive in its scope. The methodological framework used here was a standard approach permitting the exploration of teenagers’ sensitivity towards anti-tobacco messages, with respect to their cultural, psychological and sociological background.

The collected materials from the groups are rich and various, especially thanks to work with collages. In addition, the variety of the personal and cultural contexts provides meaningful insights into the mindsets of the target group.

In most cases, teenagers participated actively in the discussions, although there were a few groups where the interactions between moderator and participants were less fluid.

- Limitations of the research

The limited number of focus groups (2 per country) did not allow to work out any specific national pattern in a compelling way.

Linguistic and cultural obstacles: as mentioned above, the group discussions were conducted by native speakers. They had to be translated in some countries in order to allow interactions with the evalua consultant. Clearly, a simultaneous translation leads to a loss of information. This problem is however often compensated by the possibility to apply an “exterior”, cross-cultural eye that has proven to provide a source of a rich questioning.

Standardization of procedures aimed at identifying the consistent and coherent patterns across cultural zones. Many subtle nuances, although recorded during the research had to be abandoned in the final synthesis.

6.2 Agreement and reactions to the campaign

6.2.1 Perception of the campaign's approach

6.2.1.1 Awareness

- Very low spontaneous awareness of the campaign (at the moment of the test: 8 to 12 months after the two flights on TV).

During the focus groups and *before* actual presentation of the two TV spots, the youth were asked to give recent examples of anti-tobacco campaigns. Finland and Belgium are the only countries where the "Feel Free" campaign has been mentioned spontaneously by participants³⁴.

³⁴ The question has been asked only later, in the German focus group.

- In Finland, "Pop-stars" was identified by one of them as the best anti-tobacco campaign ever seen ("brilliant!"). In Belgium, one participant remembered the "football stars" spot.

I like this TV spot cause there were famous people who said they were not smoking – they were smiling, made me feel positive (Finland, girls)

I had this melody in mind, it was my preferred melody during a time, nevertheless that did not say much to me (Luxembourg).

- Limited prompted awareness

After the TV spots were presented, several participants recalled having spotted the campaign before³⁵. But this recall was often very fuzzy; it does not seem that the campaign has been spontaneously discussed among youth.

- ❖ In Denmark for instance, some of the boys have seen the spot of Footballers, but they didn't get the anti-tobacco message at that time.

Limited awareness can be explained by a low exposure to the campaign (i.e., by the limited media budget). It is nevertheless worth noting that campaign, when seen, can draw some curiosity and interest.

6.2.1.2 Key positive perceptions of the campaign

- **Easy-going, catchy and appealing style of the TV campaign**

Most teenagers reacted favourably to the campaign's positive spirit and easy-going "clip like" style. Both, its tone of voice and the chosen form of communication are perceived as breaking from other anti-tobacco programs and actions, especially those at school, usually "facts only" focused. Consequently, this entertainment-like approach is seen as more "catchy" than "usually highly moralising approaches on tobacco effects". Due to its cheerful spirit, the "Feel Free" Campaign can be perceived (and by some teenagers is) as an interesting alternative to "traditional" anti-tobacco messages.

At school, they give us plain facts – we need films like this (Finland, boys)

It's more tempting than books on the good effects of not smoking. (Luxembourg)

³⁵ At least one person (out of 8) declared having seen the campaign, usually on MTV or Eurosport, in the groups organized in the following countries:

Footballers : Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, Germany ...

Pop-stars : Luxembourg, France, Sweden, Finland, Germany ... (no broadcast in the Netherlands).

- **Potentially appealing popular stars**

The youth reactions show that involving popular stars (sport or music) succeeds in increasing interest in the campaign and ultimately in its message. Teenagers believe that stars can influence people's choices and attitudes and taking advantage of popular figures is a well accepted means of attracting public attention to some major issues (such as environment protection or peace). An approach based on stars' support is in general sufficiently credible, hence the teenagers shows little surprise when seeing this strategy applied to an anti-tobacco campaign.

Even famous people advise us not to smoke. People believe what famous people say. (Portugal)

These are our heroes: if they don't smoke, then we are not supposed to. (Spain)

The stars participating in the campaign succeed in catching youth's attention, incidentally provoking discussions within the groups to identify "who is who". The stars are, generally speaking, recognized, though not systematically and not by all participants. Possibility to recognize the stars is one of the main factor of adhesion to the message (identification) and consistently, any failure to do so might convey a feeling of the campaign being "not for me."

- ❖ The problem of non-recognition appears in relation to both the "Pop Stars" and the "Footballers": i.e. in one focus group, it was thought that Pop Stars was in fact mixing real people and pop stars. Participants also frequently failed to identify all the footballers' faces (this generally was the case in the girls' focus groups, but it also occurred with the boys to a more limited extent).

Most participants perceive the Feel Free stars as popular, and all in all quite appealing (and for some of them, very appealing, such as Zinedine Zidane). They represent appropriate/acceptable role models for a number of teenagers.

However, beyond the overall appeal of the stars, the critical issue concerns their **credibility** when promoting anti-tobacco values. The credibility of the characters is central to both understanding and the acceptance of the message. The idea of stars condemning tobacco use is considered by youth as plausible and meaningful, when consistent and coherent with the stars' actual image: for instance, many boys consider it impossible (or at least highly improbable) for Zinedine Zidane or Thierry Henry to smoke, while David Beckham's sincerity as a non-smoker is highly questionable (there has been some confusion with some groups - some teenagers believed the Beckham was showing up in the footballer spot). Similar doubts appear in relation to the Pop-stars (see below).

- In parallel to these overall converging perceptions, some differences in the agreement pattern can be observed country per country. The scope of the present research does not allow us to clarify these specific national results in detail, but the general capacity of the approach to generate interest and appeal should be considered in the context of youth overall exposure to anti-tobacco messages. It is possible that the degree of agreement to the campaign is lower in these countries where the youth is regularly exposed to a variety of anti-smoking communications. In these countries, youth shows a comparatively higher level of media literacy (i.e. capacity to decode the message system). As

an example, the approach seemed well accepted in Portugal or Greece, while it has been quite critically viewed in the UK, Denmark or Netherlands.

- Some youth (in Germany for instance) disconnected the credibility of the anti-smoking message, and the fact that the stars would not smoke: having experienced smoking, or even smoking right now, makes them well informed and enables them to advise on non-smoking.
- In the Netherlands, the campaign has been seen as “clip” nice to see, but with no real interest in digging in more (ie. recognizing the stars, discussing their smoking or not smoking credibility).

6.2.2 Key negative reactions

6.2.2.1 Discussing the stars appeared to be a critical issue and a key to both campaign's appeal and to its credibility.

How compelling is the testimony of the stars?

If teenagers did admit the idea of using stars (see above), the campaign's choice of characters appeared sometimes questionable. Many teenagers consider using singers or sportsmen as too much of an obvious choice (too easy and therefore not very convincing for “normal” people). Indeed, sportsmen have to care about their fitness and singers about their voice (although to a lesser extent). Therefore, they are expected not to smoke. Consequently, the relevance of their testimony as non-smokers is questioned by some teenagers.

- ❖ There were no unanimous preference patterns: ie. in Netherlands and Germany, real big stars (and not so rapidly out of fashion wannabees) are preferred to sportmen: these are people who could smoke, but don't, therefore their message is more interesting and more intriguing. There are however counterexamples (i.e. France), where footballers were far more convincing in their non-smoking message.

Legitimacy to claim the stars' status?

Second, there is a risk of using a short-lived celebrity: appeal or popularity is not often sustainable in time. The actual status of being a “star” has been indeed questioned in relation to several (unrecognizable) characters participating to the spot. Failing to catch and to identify the faces, teenagers tend to dismiss the importance of the chosen characters, perceiving them as “wannabes”, rather than genuine stars.

Is it valorising for youth to be identified as fond of these stars?

Last but not least, some teenagers are reluctant to acknowledge their interest in some specific stars. Indeed, both, sportsmen and pop stars have a power to segment youth into groups (“fan clubs”) which are highly connotative within peer groups, eventually antagonizing them (i.e. boys vs girls or pop, “cheesy” music lovers vs. hard rock listeners, etc.). While a few participants were willing to admit their admiration for one or another stars, interest was often denied to the specific pop stars seen in the spot.

- Footballers seem to be far more consensual, not only among youth, but also in reference to a broader audience (i.e. also adult audience).

6.2.2.2 Using Stars as role models can risk for the campaign to be perceived as tending to infantilize the audience

The attraction of the role models appears ambivalent. On the one hand, many of participants would acknowledge admiring some famous people and thus being sensitive about the ideas and values defended by their idols.

They are stars, they don't let themselves be influenced by others. (Germany, girls)

On the other hand, looking up at “role models” is perceived by some as a bit childish. Pop stars and footballers are in general easy to “decode” as “role models” meant to appeal to the (very) young.

Use of such role models, when combined with the perceived lack of argumentation (see below) of the “Feel Free to Say No” text, implies a perception of the campaign as being “not for us”. The explicit refusal to identify with the presupposed target audience appeared especially acute among some older teenagers (14 year olds) who were likely to reject the approach as more suitable for «young » (sic !), that is to say 8 up to 10 year olds.

(Talking about B4-4) For young girls, sexy looking guys who pretend to be a band (Finland, girls)

6.2.2.3 Suspecting some “manipulation” of the audience

One of the strengths of the campaign is its use of pop culture symbols and communicational codes in tune with youth culture. However, for this very same reason, some of the youth viewed the approach as trying too hard to appear young in its spirit. Frequently, the campaign was viewed as a product designed by an adult (a middle-aged old man in a grey suit) trying to stay “in touch” with a youth audience. The suspected lack of authenticity of the style affects the beliefs in sincerity of motivations and sincerity of message.

They can do this campaign but they may be paid to do it. They may also smoke. This is just an ad. I have doubts. Nowadays, one can't trust what people say. (Portugal)

Furthermore, the motivations of stars (in particular of pop stars) was raised spontaneously in several groups.

- French teenagers suspected that the “good cause” and mass media coverage were used to enhance one’s visibility or boost the CD sales. The parents will be willing to purchase “good education” and “good conscience” by buying the albums of “anti-tobacco militant” stars.

6.2.2.4 Overall tone of voice, fun and cool, might appear in contradiction with the seriousness of the message

We have observed no aggressive ironies, nor open hostility with regard to the Feel Free to Say No approach (and incidentally, neither to anti-tobacco messages in general). However, some elements of the campaign, both formal and content related, did provoke mockery among youth and a desire to keep distance (i.e. in most countries, the “no, no, no” theme and the “wriggling singers” were at some point grimaced at).

6.2.3 Does the rationale of the feel free to say no campaign work?

6.2.3.1 Accessibility of the campaign message

- **The anti-tobacco general objective of the campaign is clear.**

For most teenagers, the anti-tobacco message appeared quite self-evident since the campaign aims to prevent them from smoking “by simply saying so” (“Don’t smoke”).

In several groups, participants pointed at the fact, that although this message seems clear, it becomes so only once the whole clip has been carefully watched and or listened up to the end. There were two different attitudes to this “suspense” created by the spots:

- ❖ Stimulating curiosity: if you see people you like on TV saying no, so you want to know why they are saying it ;
- ❖ Indifference: just some faces appearing, you just switch off to another channel - but unconvincing argumentation.

Teenagers in the groups did not have any difficulty in understanding that the message is aimed at young people like them.

Role models are trying to tell you about non-smoking. (Finland, boys)

Opinions and interpretations were however divided between those who understood the key aim of the campaign as to make people “quit”, and those who believed, it was above all addressing “inexperienced” youth.

Although the general anti-tobacco aims were perceived, most teenagers questioned the campaign’s capacity to develop and to support the main anti-smoking message: what is the key information? What is the evidence and arguments supporting this message? The campaign appeared to many as somewhat ambivalent and overall vague in its rationale.

- **But several elements are perceived as contributing little, or even interfering with the understanding of the message:**

- ❖ **Overall too short and too quick**

- Many participants felt that the spots were too rapid for them to follow. It is difficult to get all the content (i.e. to recognize who is each of the characters) and, consequently, to understand the whole message.

Its goes too fast. Among other TV commercials, we wouldn't watch it. (France)


It's no long enough to see all the people there, if it could be like 5 second longer for each person (UK)

- In several cases, the spots should have been shown several times to allow noticing all/at least most, elements of the message. The artificial conditions of the group allowed to do so, it is however very unlikely that, in real exposure conditions, the audience would pay such attention to the spot.

- ❖ **The clip form** and its quick cutting convey a specific type of communication code: more “energetic” and less “reflexive”. This can result both in a bit of confusion, and in some cases, an indifference to the message (observed quite consistently in many countries).
- ❖ **Poor understanding of English in some countries:** with the exception of “naturally” English speaking countries, there were some (more or less enhanced) difficulties to follow up the English version. The lack of an easy and straightforward understanding of the language appears to be a serious limit to sustain interest and support for the campaign.
 - Some parts of the message were better understood than others: i.e. Sophie Ellis Baxtor claiming "Be cool, don't smoke" reached the audience relatively easily, but not the words by B4-4.



Be cool, don't smoke !



Tobacco kills: don't be fooled !

- In some countries, national versions of the clips were used (i.e. Spain, France), with subtitles in the national language. In Spain for instance, teenagers clearly seemed to be concentrating on the pictures and (to a lesser extent) the music, while text has been hardly look at.



France



Greece (pop stars)

❖ Logo.



There were some difficulties to spontaneously grasp the content (and thus the message) of the logo. Use of rather atypical colour codes can be considered among key factors of misunderstanding. In most countries, whether in “south” or in “north” of Europe, youth better associate red or black with a ban sign.

The blue-green-orange colours of the logo recall clearly other references (with no clear logical, neither emotional link to anti-tobacco message the campaign tries to convey). For instance, a fashion brand, a TV channel like MTV, Top of the Pops. The use of these unexpected colours can be perceived as positive and appealing, but it does not seem to create a deeper emotional involvement.

Not very strong feelings, it says nothing as such, but it looks fine. (Finland, girls)

In discussing the choice of colours, the opinion of a majority of the youth was in favour of a using more clear, more consistent codes. Some teenagers, however, reacted (spontaneously) and positively to this nice, pastel and colourful logo. Along with music, the colour code allows to create a positive atmosphere, “making you feel good”.

There are diverging interpretations of the conveyed message. Some participants interpret the cross as saying: banned cigarettes (“It’s bad to smoke” or “Don’t smoke!”).

- However, some participants were sensitive (i.e. Germany) to potential contradictions – e.g. one cigarette appears “broken”, but only by another one, which is not broken.

❖ **Little visibility of the “pan-European” approach, and incidentally, little interest in this.**

Nobody in the groups picked up spontaneously the international or pan-European dimension of the campaign (i.e. English language, internationally recognized stars). No one in any of the groups seemed to notice nor the European flag - and neither the name of UEFA.



Footballers ad



Pop stars ad

When prompted, though, it was perceived as a positive aspect of the campaign, but not as the most important one. Teenagers are used to “international” communication in general, hence little impact is to be expected from this international scope.

- Most participants would fail to recognize the “authority” behind the message (i.e. European Union or UEFA). Only when prompted, are they in position to comment on it, eventually minimizing the relevance of the institution.

6.2.3.2 Discussion and assessment of the campaign anti-tobacco message.

- **The claim, "Feel Free to Say No", brings up a important issue of freedom of choice**

Teenagers only think about freedom. It's what they have in mind. (Belgium, girl)

Through its main claim “Feel free to say No”, the campaign succeeds in addressing a very relevant issue to youth: self-determination and independence. All teenagers – boys and girls alike – agreed that these are both their ultimate motivation and a major challenge in their social life.

- ❖ The “Feel free to say no” message has been widely commented upon and appreciated for instance in Netherlands, where the teenagers, both girls and boys insisted on their right to decide for themselves. Nobody, they say, can decide for us and “we want to know what it is”.
- **To be free from adults' authority matters more then to be free from peer group pressure.**

Teenagers discussed the independence issue mainly in relation to their passage to adulthood, which is most often understood in terms of empowerment to take one’s own decisions in life. For most of the 13-14 years old, to be able to show their adulthood is at stake. Cigarette fulfils for many this symbolic role (incidentally enhanced by the age limit laws, especially in these countries where the legal age limit is 16, according to the group in the UK).

- ❖ **Peer group pressure – sensitive issue of integration**

Most of participants agree that the peer pressure group exists. They are aware of the importance of their friends. The support and acceptance of their peers is for them both socially and emotionally important.

When it comes to smoking, the pressure can be more or less open, more or less strong (including a friendly invitation to “have a fag” or tougher intimidation).

I tried a couple of times, first at around 12, I didn't really like it, it made me feel sick. I will probably try again, at a party where everybody else does it... (UK)

It's not easy. If many people smoke around us, we are afraid not to be part of the group. It's difficult to say no and stay friend. (Portugal)

Peer group pressure seems particularly high for the first experience. If all teenagers smoked their first cigarette “out of curiosity”, many simply want to catch up with others (everybody else smokes, so I need to do the same, at least to be able to say “I tried it”).

➤ For most, if not all, the very first experience with cigarettes is disappointing and not enjoyable at all (i.e. feeling sick, coughing). Furthermore, even those who smoke regularly are often aware of nuisances related to smoking (ie. smell), incidentally making it less appealing than other psychotropic substances (i.e. alcohol).

Interestingly enough, after their first experience, some non-smokers seem less susceptible to peer pressure. In the end, everybody knows who smokes and who does not and, as a result, smokers and (initiated) non-smokers can live together.

❖ However, there can be some competition between the two groups. This example of football matches comes from UK: boys participating in the groups acknowledge that there were regular matches “smokers” against “non-smokers” at their school, incidentally, non smokers loosing most of the time...

The question of smoking can reappear when a major change occurs in one’s life (for instance, changing schools). It becomes again a symbolic instrument to create an image for self when interacting with strangers (cf. both desire to appear desirable, desire to be simply accepted).

In such situations, the campaign’s suggestion to “say no” is of little relevance, not the least because the campaign says little about how to refuse.

➤ Cigarettes thus play an important symbolic role not only to assess one’s adulthood, but also to be able to penetrate into an appealing, often old group of people. Smoking is in some cases “instrumentalized”, being viewed as a means to socialize. Some non-smokers in our groups indicate that they might smoke in the future, for instance if they were trying to enter into a specific group of people.

If you get to a new school and you want to appear tougher, it might a good idea to smoke (Finland, girls)

If you smoke, you can get new friends, you can hang around with older friends (Finland, girls)

I used to walk around with a cigarette, 'cause it looked cool (UK)

- **The campaign addresses the relevant issue of personal choice of “to smoke or not to smoke”**

Youth understand the message of the campaign in encouraging them to free themselves from the peer group pressure, and not to feel obliged to do something they spontaneously feel a bit reluctant to undertake. The freedom to choose that comes across in the clips is important to them.

It means: be free to say no. It’s not compulsory to be like others. We can do what we feel like. (Portugal)

Many teenagers agreed that this is an important issue for them to be able to say no.

It's good cause not forbidding – you don't need to feel you are obliged. (Finland, girls)

It's good when you have a lot of friends who smoke, you don't need to feel pressure – it's for you to choose, to make your mind. (Finland, girls)

- **But the campaign did not succeed in reinforcing the idea of saying “no”**

Most teenagers reacted to an apparent lack of argumentation of the anti-smoking message.

Can't just say no, must tell why. (Spain)

Say no, but why? It should be more discussed. (France)

It was made for young people because it's superficial. They didn't think about the effects for example. They thought famous singers would influence more the young's imagination, but it's not effective. (Italy)

Furthermore, a majority of the young respondents identified several hidden contradictions and inconsistencies in the way the campaign deals with the issue.

- **Out of the context, the claim makes no specific link to tobacco.**

Participants in most groups observed that the claim “Feel Free to Say No” can be understood only in a specific context.

- ❖ The link to anti-tobacco message is a critical one: for instance, one of the participants noted that even though she “remembered the melody for some time as one of her favourites”, she didn't make any specific link to the anti-tobacco message after all.

« You don't know what is it about in the end » (UK)

« It doesn't make you think of anything » (UK)

- **Ambivalence of the choice given**

The basic intent behind the “Feel Free” approach seems, overall, to come across quite clearly, and positively. Some participants perceive the suggestion that people are not free if they succumb to pressures from others to smoke. At the same time, the phrase also raises the possibility of an alternative choice, i.e. to feel free to say “yes”.

This problem occurred in particular among English native-speakers (UK, Ireland, and to a lesser extent in Nordic countries) for whom “Feel free” connotes politeness rather than idea of individual freedom. The message, in consequence, is perceived as not relevant to neither its source nor to its audience. As there are no other messages or signs to enhance the idea of freedom the important meaning seems lost.

« Unlike your parents, who when trying to control you they'd say, don't smoke, here they give you a choice ». (UK)

“It might mean: to smoke”. (Sweden)

« It's up to you: you can say yes, you can say no ». (UK)

- **There is a contradictory message, that of freedom to choose, while at the same time clearly indicating that the choice should be “no”.**

“Say no” it’s as if someone obliged us to say no. (Italy)

While the campaign appears to be putting forth a choice (“feel free to say no”), it is simultaneously delivering a conventionally authoritarian message: “don’t smoke”. The campaign, young people argued, only pretends to give them a choice. In reality, they feel that they are being treated like small children and just told not to do something, with no further justification or information for why they should make this choice.

Freedom doesn’t imply to say no. We smoke when we are stressed, when our sense of self is in danger, we smoke to be free. (Luxemburg)

- **The underlying paternalistic tone of voice**

Many teenagers interpreted the campaign message as (paradoxically) being an expression of a paternalistic attitude of adults. To some, the campaign includes a bit of hidden authoritarianism and “saving-the-world” militancy.

(Describing the author of the message) as someone older, in his 30ties, who doesn’t smoke himself and who has strong principles - someone who wants to save the world. (Finland, girls)

This approach is perceived as inappropriate because it is contradictory with widely accepted values of a “post-modern” society: tolerance and individual freedom.

All this no-no-no business just puts you off. (Spain)

- Especially in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, as well as the Netherlands), young people seem particularly sensitive about this issue. It is worth noting that in these countries, the cultural environment tends to encourage them to self-determination.

Furthermore, the target group is going through a stage of life where the idea of authority is increasingly challenged. A too much authoritarian message is likely to revolt many teenagers.

- This aspect has been particularly well expressed by girls, for instance in the UK or in France (but also in many other countries): when someone tells you “don’t do that”, you feel exactly like doing the opposite, so it is the best way to make you go for it (so they say). So there is a strong danger that emphasising the dangers of smoking, and telling youth that they should not, do this can perversely increase their desire to do so. The literature also indicates that this is a very real possibility.

Excitement of hiding, of doing something forbidden (Spain)

To do something different, forbidden (smoking in the house with friends when the parents were away. (Netherlands).

I think in the places like school, where you are not allowed to smoke, it makes it more exciting, you’re trying to get away with it, you’re having fun. (UK)

- **Lack of argumentation behind the anti-tobacco message.**

The reasons given to “say no” are limited, if present at all.

For instance, some participants question the link between being able to say “no” and the fact of being free. The freedom issue clearly is important and the campaign should not lose this. It would need however to present more reasons why youth should choose “no”, in order to be better received.

To come up with a compelling argumentation though is not very easy. Most, if not all of the participants are aware of “usual” arguments against tobacco. However, they have still more to say about why they need to smoke. For many, there are “real” advantages of smoking:

- ❖ Cigarette is experienced as a “normal” thing among growing teenagers: it’s a part of their initiation to adulthood, of the group experience. The first cigarette is most of the time a very disappointing, even painful experience (feeling sick, etc), easily overcome though (after all, it is not easy to become an adult, and the little suffering does make sense, as adulthood gives privileges ...).
- ❖ For more regular smokers, smoking is a part of their lifestyle, often perceived as temporal (“stage of life”).
- ❖ As discussed above, - the “social” dimension of smoking experience is also an important key to teenagers mindsets: it’s rare to start alone (though there are examples) and the integration into a group (whether real or virtual), being accepted by adults who “suddenly start talking to you” matters.
- ❖ Issue of creating social image for self as a part of the assessment of one’s identity.
- ❖ Asserting independence, to appear older, more mature (girls) and more daring.
- ❖ Psychotropic effect (rare, but mentioned in different countries among both girls and boys) – sometimes genuine, sometimes not distinct from the “ambiance”
- ❖ Simply coping with boredom and aimlessness ...

If you worry, it calms you down. (Ireland)

It keeps your mind busy a bit for a moment. (Ireland)

It is very relaxing to smoke. You sit somewhere... I don't know if it is the cigarette or the chair. (Netherlands)

When you smoke it makes you feel better, you fit in (...) older people start talking to you. (UK)

It's a sort of privilege, just to get hold of cigarettes, you can say you are 16. (UK)

6.2.3.3 Additional comments on specific TV spots

- **Pop-stars**

Comparatively speaking, the "Pop Stars" spot appears more appealing and, all in all, more interesting. At a first glance, it seemed to succeed in getting across its major message with at least some emotional impact. For instance, addressing youth with the message "Be cool, don't smoke" is perceived as more straightforward, and actually, a more interesting one.

- ❖ Especially in comparison with "Footballers", the young respondents pointed at its colourful style, containing "more power". The colour code, bright and vivid, is indeed consistent with the underlying imagery of a non smoking value system (cf. collage: black & white for smokers).

"Pop stars" spot is seen as more enjoyable, more 'catchy'. The sound track creates an "ambience and atmosphere". Music is "by definition" considered more positive and, consequently, it "makes you feel happy". In several countries (ie. UK, Ireland) it has been observed that teenagers reacted physically to the musical rhythm of the pop-star clip. In several countries (Finland, Luxembourg) some teenagers have already heard the song and enjoy the clip.

It's the ambience, the atmosphere in the pop stars spot. When we listen to the music, we feel happy. (Portugal)

A softer and more subtle way to say that someone is stupid if he smokes. (Portugal)

The credibility of the popular stars proves to be a major limit to the message acceptance. The main question asked is, why would they recommend that one should not smoke?

More than footballers, pop-stars tend to lack credibility as anti-tobacco "militants". Smoking and taking drugs are considered as "natural" attributes of a pop-star's lifestyle and (promotional) image. Teenagers believe that some of the stars appearing in the campaign either still smoke, or at least once did. At several occasions, teenagers pointed out at public appearances of several pop-stars with cigarette.

In most groups, teenagers questioned the sincerity of the stars' motivations. Contradictions between the message (don't smoke) and actual behaviour in real life provokes questions about deep motives to participate in anti-tobacco campaign. The issue of financial reward, in particular, was spontaneously mentioned in several groups. In other cases, it has been stated that the pop stars - while not directly paid for their participation in the spots - are obtaining (indirect) benefits from the campaign for self promotion. Visibility in mass media to increase recognition, being pointed at as a positive role model for young: the motivations of the pop stars are, all in all, quite mercantile in aiming at increase in album sales (perversely appealing also to parents who would feel comfortable offering their disks to their son or daughter).

Strikingly, even when informed by the moderator that the participation to the campaign is genuine (i.e. that all of these stars are non smokers and all appeared without payment of any kind), the teenagers did not believe this, rich and famous people such as these wouldn't do something like this unless they were paid.

- ❖ At the same time, in some groups (ie. Portugal, Germany), teenagers insisted that the first-hand experience of smoking, can make the anti-tobacco message more legitimate, as the pop stars "know what they are talking about". As a result, this can make them think when these stars say "no" to smoking.

Finally, the "pop-stars" spot is seen as a bit "goodie-goodie". The music is judged "poppy" and "cheesy". Comparatively, it is more infantile than the "footballers".

- **Footballers**

The overall credibility in supporting the anti-tobacco of the sportsmen seems much stronger. The footballers are recognised as famous stars, as "role models", especially for boys (consistent perception in both girls & boys groups). It is assumed that athletes such as them would not smoke (although this understanding might diminish the interest for message).

Footballers are healthy people - and they practice sport as well... It's easy to believe that these people do not smoke. (Portugal)

- Comments and analyses in the boys groups show their interest in the issue of smoking and in their own future. Boys can make a link between the idea of footballers "having a future" and the fact that they don't smoke.

At the same time, the Footballer spot is perceived as:

- ❖ Too "preachy" regarding the tone of voice: footballers just say 'no', but don't add anything to support their message.
- ❖ Having a too exclusive male target audience (most of the girls don't feel concerned by it).
- ❖ Last, but not least, the Footballers spot lacks the main factors contributing to the relative success of Pop Stars (black & white, less interesting sound track, etc...).

The choice of footballers has been discussed in several countries (ie. Denmark), especially by the groups of boys. Many participants would also like to see other sports represented in the spot.

6.3 Contribution to the image of non-smokers

6.3.1 Spontaneous representations of smoking and non-smoking lifestyle show remarkable convergencies

When a boy sees a girl smoking, he will look at her, that's it. (Belgium, girl)

Despite some differences, the overall representations proved to be quite consistent across the countries and groups, independently from the overall judgement or appeal of smoking among the participants (even though concrete group dynamics, as well as the personalities and experiences of the participants might have occasionally enhanced some aspects of the social image of both smokers and non-smokers).

- The perceived differences are related to local cultural, legal and communication environment. In some countries - France, Ireland - a powerful campaign on damage to appearance caused by smoking generated higher than elsewhere degree of awareness of these specific issues. Despite these, the research resulted in an overall consistent portrait of smokers and of non-smokers. The key factors highlighted below are based on the information collected during the focus groups, both verbal and visual (participants were asked to create a collage)

6.3.1.1 Portraits of a smoker show a more complex (richer?) psychological picture.

- Smokers are questioning the world in general, its social norms and laws, and his/her own place in it: a smoker is often described as a rebel (often signified by rock stars notorious for his/her radical views), struggling with at least some degree of success against social "do's and don'ts", trying (and incidentally succeeding) in challenging (mainstream) morals. Images of gangs, marginalized groups or individualized are frequent.

Someone who smokes has his own way of being (...) to become more aggressive, more independent, to feel like an adult. (Portugal, girls)

- The cigarette provides the smoker with some kind of mental empowerment, providing him/her with a tool to fight or in helping to release the stress: smokers are often described as more relaxed, "cool" (in a sense of detachment and not in terms of being "in"). The negative aspect of this mental empowerment would include a displayed excessive self-confidence and sense of "superiority", seeing oneself the "king", all of this eventually becoming a means of intimidation (sometimes probably bullying) with regard to non-smokers.

Those who smoke think those who don't are « weak » (Finland, boys)

They think they are grown up, better than us. (Portugal, boys)

Smokers show off ; they feel stronger. (France, girls)

The smoker is more relaxed, he is more interesting. (Austria, girls)

People who like to break the rules. (Spain, boys)



Smokers, portrayed by the girls' (left) and the boys' (right) groups, in the Netherlands

- There is obviously some ambivalence about the underlying lifestyle of adult smokers: teenagers would see themselves (often successfully) involved in (social) competition and hence developing toughness and experiencing stress. For growing teenagers, this might appear as a genuine experience of real world, far away from the carelessness and cheerfulness of the childhood. Smokers are perceived as individuals engaged in coping with the world outside: a tough world.

If we want to succeed, "to be the king", we need to smoke. (France, girls)

- A smoker is someone who is exploring or already experienced sexuality: evidence is specifically provided by suggestive pictures of eroticized and sexy bodies, flirting couples, etc.
- Lack of inhibition is often underlined by use of other psychotropic substances like alcohol or drugs. The result of physical exhaustion is present: many pictures would show smokers looking badly, red eyes, tired or amorphous (lacking physical energy).
- The representation of social integration presents a dual pattern: smokers might be both popular (surrounded by admiration, respect, etc. – cf. stars) and lonely (challengers of social order).
 - ❖ On the one hand, he or she often is perceived as having a better social integration: unlike the non-smokers (cf. below), smokers are surrounded by other people, peer groups, friends: smokers are never (or rarely) alone and this sociability of smokers stands obviously for the most appealing feature of their lifestyle – interestingly enough, also among convinced non-smokers.
 - ❖ Nevertheless, in these collages, rebellious-looking smokers are also presented alone; this is consistent with the figure of the protestor, breaking the rules.


6.3.1.2 Representations of non-smokers: a happy, idyllic world.

(Describing the non-smoking planet) Sunny, green, the Pope would live there. (Finland, boys)

- Whether pro-smoking or not, participants to our groups would consistently sketch happy, cheerful, healthy non-smokers: a smoke-free world is definitely much more colourful, less painful in all ways, closer to the nature.

This very appealing (to an adult's eye) description of the non-smoking lifestyle shouldn't be taken at its face value, as the comments and explanations provided in groups demonstrate.

- Non-smokers appear to live in an idealized world, in other words, either not a real one (or at least out of the reach) either no longer accessible (i.e. protected childhood – that some would like also to reject) – non-smoking can be perceived as a luxury only few can afford (also in mental sense) or sustain in time.
- The psychological portrait of non-smokers enhances his/her innocence and overall lack of tensions (very unlike smokers and very much unlike teenagers themselves). When perceived positively, this means a highly enviable peace of mind and happy life. At the same time, innocence means also some kind of naivety: a state of “non-initiation”, where an individual has not experienced yet the complexity of the real world.



Portraits of non-smokers by Portuguese boys (left) and Belgian girls (right)

- The sexual identity of non-smoker is somewhat blurred: the feminine figures seem to dominate with the ultimate icon of a mother. Despite some cultural differences in perception of gender roles and identities, we found in several countries a tendency to attribute non-smoking behaviour to female identity (non-smoking boys incidentally being described as lacking virility or at least maturity – ie. “sissy”, “mummy’s boy”).

- Unlike smokers, non-smokers are good pupils, “good girls” or “good boys” obeying and conforming to order imposed upon them by adults authority: this somewhat “goodie-goodie” profile is particularly apparent in answers provided by (regularly) smoking teenagers, though, surprisingly enough, not exclusively among them!

He looks like a good boy. He learnt what he has been taught. (Luxembourg, filles)

The non-smoker is like everybody; he is harmless. (Austria, girls)

- A non-smoking lifestyle is seen both as an active and responsible one: non-smokers are often associated with sport, healthy diets and nature (used both in an ecological sense or in personality feature: a “natural” person).

A person who thinks. (Portugal, girls)

Those who don't smoke have good self-esteem. (Austria, girls)

6.3.2. Contribution of the “Feel free” campaign to convey appealing non-smoking lifestyle values

The image of non-smoker comes across at a dual level:

- ❖ The actual characters – stars – participating to the campaign
- ❖ The projected audience – i.e. the image of teenagers likely to be attracted by it and expected to follow the “campaign advice”.

Using popular stars to represent a non-smoker lifestyle appears somewhat ambivalent in its success in enhancing the social image of this lifestyle. For instance, being successful (socially, professionally) means to be rich, hence having the opportunity to enjoy life and to be able to self indulge.

However, and probably more importantly, **the image of a teenager who would genuinely identify with – and comply with – the message is somewhat potentially problematic:**

- ❖ a person with little autonomy, little personality (cf. need for role models),
- ❖ basically, lacking maturity – still a bit naive fascination with the world of stars (cf. innocence and non-initiation above),
- ❖ a person who obeys authority without questioning its legitimacy or reasons why (ie. stars saying just “don’t do”).

Thus, the “Feel free”-like non-smoker appears as an easy-to-influence person.

The style and the argumentation of the campaign reinforces the carefree, innocent, “goodie-goodie” representation of a non-smoker.

It is not therefore surprising, that teenagers (even those non-smoking) tend to refuse to identify with this image of a non-smoking audience.

6.4 Behavioural intentions induced by the campaign

The prompted responses of youth, concerning the potential impact of the Feel free campaign, point at a limited effectiveness of the TV spots.

- There were few exceptions to this overall consistent pattern: some participants (in Spain, in France) did acknowledge that the campaign could make think about the issue of smoking/non-smoking. Yet all say that the campaign would be laughed at by their (smoking) friends and class mates.

This result of potentially weak impact should be analysed in relation to both the intrinsic values of this specific campaign and to broader attitudes of youth with regard to smoking and anti-smoking initiatives.

As highlighted previously, there was no evidence of rejection of the anti-tobacco message. Indifference appears most likely to occur. Some teenagers might perceive anti-tobacco communication in terms of (normal) information – important to have, but with little influence upon their personal attitude, or even with a contrary effect.

*You get it from everywhere – so you get tired; it makes you feel doing the contrary.
(Finland, girls)*

Frankly, this initiative is good, but the more we are told not to do it, the more we feel like to do it. (France, girls)

6.4.1 Although some might manifest some interest and support, most participants are uninterested in anti-tobacco messages

The 13-14 year olds do not identify themselves with a target group for anti-tobacco campaigns.

They do not perceive themselves either as smokers (even though they can smoke regularly) nor as addicted. Many insist upon their ability to stop smoking whenever they want.

- This attitude is particularly striking among fairly regular “social” smokers (that is to say, many of the respondents acknowledge smoking with friends, at the parties, most often when drinking alcohol). We should remain cautious and not take youth statements about their smoking habits at face value. They tend to underestimate their tobacco consumption (or, in some rare cases, conversely, overestimate it in order to boost).
- “Tenderfoot” smokers (i.e. beginners, holiday smokers) are often even more radical in anti-smoking views and consequently feel even less interested or affected by anti-tobacco messages. These younger participants to the research (13 year olds) are still closer to childhood and still display a strong sense of responsiveness to their parent’s authority. Their experiments with smoking are driven by curiosity, a desire to do “as everybody else”, or just simply to be able to say “I did it”. It is interesting to note their expectations with regard to the future behaviour. There has been a significant number of beginners expecting to smoke in the future (mainly because everybody else does). Some of them perceive smoking as fate and would rather “hope” to avoid smoking rather than to commit not to do so.

- “Smoking is natural” for many teenagers, whether they smoke or not themselves, it is your choice to go for it or not.

Once you want to smoke, you’ll smoke regardless whatever anybody else says.

6.4.2 Most participants consider being well aware and well informed about the risks of smoking

- Young people consider themselves well informed on the issue. This seems particularly true in the north of Europe where most (if not all) participants say that they are regularly and extensively exposed to information about the health dangers of smoking, be it from media, from health professionals or at school.

- ❖ **Media campaigns:** In several countries, we could observe a direct impact of national anti-smoking campaigns. Examples have been quoted spontaneously in groups, i.e. the INPES campaign about cigarette contents in France, the “lipstick” campaign in Ireland.

Without the whole of information I have today, I would not be as sure of the dangers [of smoking]: articles, magazines, television, all of that. There are many advertisements saying not to smoke (Portugal, boys).

- ❖ **School programs:** conducted by teachers or external experts, these programs are perceived as mainly “fact” driven and informative. It seems however, that the tobacco issues are tackled less frequently than other health dangers (i.e. drugs, cannabis).

At school, you should talk about it, but not all the time: people don’t pay attention to what is being said at school... (Finland, girls)

- ❖ As reported by children, the topic seems never or rarely addressed by parents themselves

My parents say: you are a sensible girl and we trust you – so they don’t want to talk to about the issue (...) It would be good to have parents talking about it, so they show they care. (Finland, girls)

Despite some significant national differences with respect to anti-tobacco policies, many respondents display quite impressive (at least theoretical) knowledge about tobacco and smoking issues. Indeed, in some countries, information and communication about tobacco epidemics are omnipresent and there is widespread awareness of health risks related to smoking.

All the same, there is overall a low identification with tobacco addiction and health risk, and even straightforward denial of the risks for themselves.

- The teenagers in the groups do not bring up issues related to sickness or death (tobacco provoked). For instance, risks of cancer in particular were not raised in the discussion. When these dramatic issues were raised by the moderator, these were not described by the participants as a personal risk but more as a risk for (older) relatives (especially parents).

At our age it does not matter; to get problems one must smoke a lot: and for me it is a long way to go. (Spain)

- ❖ Several participants had a first-hand experience with dramatic smoking effects (relatives with serious health problems, e.g. operations and even death): despite this painful and very real experience, many would still start smoking...
- ❖ The campaigns dramatizing the smoking issue have been widely and spontaneously discussed in all groups. Scary approaches are perceived as impressive, yet many teenagers don't want to see them.

If you show some disgusting images, I would just turn my eyes off the screen. (Finland, girls)

- Addiction is viewed as a much more concrete danger related to smoking.

Many occasional smokers express clear concerns about becoming addicted. Addiction is a situation that can be easily observed (parents, friends or schoolmates). Some participants acknowledge having experienced an addiction feeling (i.e. having a cigarette on your own, lonely).

However, if addiction is a real threat, it remains abstract to many of them. While youth can see what an addicted behaviour looks like, they fail to grasp the overall process (when do I become dependent on tobacco?) until it is too late.

This issue is of utmost concern for some occasional smokers, who, though aware of the addiction risk, don't necessarily perceive the link between their smoking habits and addiction. They are firmly convinced they will be able to stop any moment they wish.

It is ok to smoke, but you should stop by 25. (Finland, girls)

- Physical deterioration: the visible effects of tobacco use are the most frequently mentioned nuisance associated with smoking, especially among girls. The collages show a clear evidence of physical repulsion towards smoking individuals: unpleasant smell, red eyes, blemish skin, yellow teeth and yellowish fingers. This picture does make an impression on the youth minds, on both boys and girls.
 - The topic of personal appearance was addressed in most countries, but it has been particularly present in Ireland or France, where mass media campaigns tackled this issue.
- Last, but not least, fitness proves to be an important and also concrete issue.

Some participants did testify having experienced the impact of smoking on their physical resistance (ie. climbing stairs, doing some sport). This is a particularly relevant topic for some boys, especially those more active in sport. While sickness and death seem very remote to these young boys and girls, a deleterious effect on physical condition can be a compelling argument to give up smoking.

6.4.3 Teenagers are confronted with a complex environment and the anti-tobacco message is not always compelling enough

- Making the tobacco a lesser evil: some teenagers tend to dismiss the tobacco danger especially in comparison to other substances (alcohol/hashish). Several testimonies of teenagers downgraded the negative effects of tobacco compared to drugs.

We have got pins against drugs, but not against smoking. (Finland, girls)

Tomorrow, you can get killed by a car, so now enjoy your life. (Netherlands, boys)

There is a difference between hash and smoking, I definitely say no to hash, but smoking... (Ireland, boys)

- Youth is still genuinely credulous and might have some difficulty in coping with contradictory messages, especially among the youngest adolescents. Information coming from adults comes up against (and sometimes contradicts) "information" displayed within the peer groups. Some teenagers might find it difficult to make a clear-cut difference (lack of benchmarks, problems of authorities).

- ❖ A good illustration of the problem was found in UK, where one of the boys recalled having heard about David Beckham's performance as due to ... smoking: "it helps him running".

- ❖ More banal, but probably equally preoccupying, are "methods" of avoiding the nuisances and harmfulness of tobacco use: as one of the participants explained, "everybody knows" it wise to chew a gum while smoking, in order to reduce tobacco related risks ...

I was told that it was better to inhale it, that if you keep smoke in my mouth, you got a mouth cancer – everybody says it and also to chewing gum at the same time...(UK)

- Some cynicism with regard to anti-tobacco initiatives

- ❖ Exposing hypocrisy of adults: many teenagers pointed at contradictions between moralising verbal prohibitions by adults and the reality around them, e.g.: the possibility of smoking in public places (or transgressing formal legal bans), inconsistency between the message delivered to youth and personal smoking behaviour among adults.

Teenagers wish that parents and adults would adopt a more coherent and clear approach regarding smoking. As one respondent in France put it: parents should be more consistent in their message.

I know people who smoke, while saying to you shouldn't. (Finland, girls)

Teachers say smoking is bad, but they smoke – what do you make of that? (Spain)

- ❖ Suspecting hypocrisy on behalf of the government, which while exposing tobacco dangers, takes advantage of its taxes. Tobacco is a good business for too many (public government, companies...)

People won't stop smoking – this is a good business, cheap to produce". (Denmark)

Government says no, but at the same time they collect taxes. (France)

- ❖ Tackling environmental smoking issues: a few respondents point at the certainty of being exposed to smoke.

6.5 Capacity of the campaign to promote non-smoking attitudes and behaviours

Even though the Campaign can be seen as “a nice try” and an “experiment”, teenagers remain sceptical concerning its real effect.

It's good, but not to stop smoking. (Germany).

It wouldn't have impact alone, as such – maybe just a little bit – nobody would quit, but maybe those who think about starting would think again? (Finland, boys)

It can't do any harm – even if I am not touched, maybe those who like these stars would be influenced. (Finland, girls)

- **Appealing but superficial campaign**

Even those who enjoy the tone of the campaign (ie. Pop stars in particular), believe that it would have **little effect in dealing with actual everyday life situations**. The emotional appeal is too short-lived to sustain the message on mid and long-term.

- ❖ Stars are not necessarily credible, neither compelling in communicating against tobacco.

People we have seen in the spot, I would have seen them as smokers. Our collage is closer to reality. (Italy)

- ❖ Lack of compelling argumentation: the Feel Free campaign is viewed as less informative than other campaigns as it provides little information about tobacco effects.

It's pretty, all these famous singers, but we don't understand the meaning, the message. (Italy)

Our attention is attracted by the singers, all the faces, but we don't pay attention to what they say. (Italy)

When someone offers us a cigarette ... in our mind ... we're not going to think about it again. (France, girls)

I won't think about this commercial, when someone offers me a cigarette. (Netherlands)

The weakness of the argumentation, the touch of frivolity and, last, but not least, use of the clip-like, hectic rhythm makes the campaign – in this form – unlikely to result in a change of attitude.

It is like a bill board or commercial on a bus – you see it, but you don't have time to think about it and soon after you forget ». (Denmark, boys)

I would think for 2 seconds and then the next commercial comes – and I forget all about it... (Finland, girls)

“Feel Free to Say No” campaign offers little new or original information. The campaign does not convey any new messages, especially in the countries where anti-tobacco lobbying is already strong.

I don't think it is any better than teaching we get at school. (Finland, boys)

We all know there is no future for cigarettes. (Denmark, boys)

I know already all that stuff. (Denmark, boys)

- “Feel Free to Say No” might create some perverse mechanisms resulting in increased interest in smoking.

Famous people, it's a good motivation to change, but it could also be negative because perceived as a challenge to smoke. (...) The reaction may be: “no, I will smoke”. (Italy)

- The “Feel free” message as a mass media campaign is viewed as too distanced: too abstract, too far away from real experiences, as too far “from real life”.

In several countries, participants considered that the campaign fails to connect teenagers with (their) reality.

In discos, you always see someone smoking. In the spot, nothing connects us with reality. (Italy)

The major limitation is in failing to create a credible link to the real experiences of youth with respect to the context in which smoking takes place, more importantly, with respect to their actual lives; teenagers could always see some people smoking.

But it's always advertisement, I don't let myself be influenced by that (...) What matters is my group, my friends: if my friends stop, I'll stop ! (Luxembourg)

They cannot influence young. Only friends can do that. Commercials have no influence, it is a waste of money. (Netherlands)

(Talking about the INPES campaign on the content of cigarettes): it looks more natural, it's reality, we get out of the dream, of the influence of singers... (France)

If you get them got in the school, more people might actually listen, but you can't just watch it on TV people just get bored with it. (UK)

Participants in some groups suggested that using “normal” people would increase the authenticity of the overall message.

I'd rather see the young talking about their experience, why they don't smoke. (France, girls)

The real life situations, it makes you think. (UK)

To further explore this aspect, the “Feel Free to Say No” 2003 press campaign –print material for magazines – was presented during the groups in Austria and received a fairly positive response. It seems to address the distance from real life that was evident in the TV spots.

- However, some participants who saw themselves as non-smokers (though vulnerable to smoking pressure) did reacted a bit more positively about the campaign's impact. It is perceived as an additional argument to confirm their own personal choice not to smoke. As any anti-tobacco message, those young people feel reassured by a support coming from other, well-known and appealing characters.

This film persuades me that I am right. (Portugal)

It could help me resist (pressures to smoke) – it makes you think (Spain)

Additional food for thought

- The Feel Free campaign, though it succeeds in catching the attention by using popular stars, fails to build on this positive. The campaign can attract attention, but does not build upon this, mainly due to a lack of strong and compelling arguments for not smoking:
 - ❖ Can we be more explicit in terms what are the appealing values that would make non-smoking worthwhile?
 - ❖ Can we communicate the real, and also realistic, benefits of being a non-smoker ?
"I don't smoke", people look at me and say it's good.
A friend who was smoking told me: "Frankly, congratulations !" (Belgium, two girls)
- There is also an ambivalence of the message objective: to prevent youth from starting to smoke at all (unrealistic) or to encourage give up smoking (irrelevant argumentation).
- The campaign draws attention to other issues than simply an anti-tobacco message. The presence of stars is central and, in consequence, "cannibalises" the main message of the campaign, at least to some extent.

There are however arguments which might present some value in their eyes, enough to make them think. Among the most frequently mentioned are:

- ❖ money (managing their pocket money, making choices: to go for cigarettes or for a CD ...)
- ❖ feeling and being fit (being able to run faster)
- ❖ emotional commitment (not to smoke because of a promise given to a friend ...)

These positive arguments can be translated into actual immediate benefits, which would be much more compelling than threats of future loss (i.e. mortal risk, that is too far in the future to be relevant to most teenagers).

7. INTERVIEWS WITH NATIONAL FOCAL POINTS AND EXPERTS

7.1 Objectives and methods

The terms of reference for this evaluation specified *inter alia* the following objectives:

- “To assess the role of all contributors to the campaign (European Commission, National and Local Governments, Non governmental Organisations) and recommend a strategy for the management and administration of future campaigns.
- The effectiveness of the actions will be assessed in each of the 15 countries and will take into account the differences in legislation and organisation of national authorities.”

These questions are addressed in our methodology through the interviews carried out in the 15 Member States, the expert e-mail panel, and the meetings with experts and partner institutions.

Actual contributions to the campaign by the various partners is strongly related to their interest in co-operating. We understand the above objectives as not only describing the level of contribution, but also in identifying the reasons for this, in order to be able to identify realistic approaches for the management of future campaigns³⁶.

Research on the reasons for co-operation is related in particular to differences in national contexts and anti-tobacco public policies. The viewpoints of partners about the campaign also affects their willingness to co-operate with it, even if these views often are a reflection of these contextual differences.

Please note that we will use hereafter the words "National Focal Points" (NFPs) to refer to the many stakeholders with institutional or individual relations to the management of the campaign. They are often referred to as "NGOs" but, as a matter of fact, as some of them insisted, many are official bodies. That is the reason why we preferred "NFPs" ... even if some of them have not been designated as NFPs or candidates to this function.

³⁶ As the terms of reference require “the identification of likely outputs and outcomes from the campaign with explanations of the causal links”.

7.2 Evolution of the partnership between the European campaign and the National Focal Points

- **The degree of partnership between the NFPs and the Commission's campaign/ Media Consulta was very low at the beginning of the campaign.**

Many NFPs, if not all, were openly critical about the campaign for various reasons:

- ❖ The vast majority had not been involved in the strategic design of the campaign, and they were asked to support the campaign once it was already launched, without the possibility of influencing or contributing to it in any way. It was also too late for the NFPs to integrate it with other activities or events, or to prepare local actions.
 - ❖ Some NFPs were wary of the German firm, Media Consulta, because, according to them, the German government, and hence this communication firm, were under the influence of the tobacco industry. This concern was alleviated when the PFN got to know Media Consulta better and when it became clear to them that it did not work for the tobacco industry.
 - ❖ Some NFPs also stressed the lack of specific funding for local actions. Although the Commission asked for the support of NFPs and their active participation as national partners of the European campaign, some NFPs do not wish to commit themselves to extra work or promotion activities for which they would not receive any specific financing. In this context, the potential support of these NFPs is at best passive in nature.
- **The NFPs' interest towards the campaign has gradually improved with the increase of communication between the European Commission, Media Consulta and the NFPs.** The partnership building meeting in December 2002 in Luxemburg was quite useful in keeping everybody in touch and in facilitating dialogue on the next stages of the campaign. The designation of country managers within Media Consulta made communication and work with NFPs easier.
 - **Thus, in June 2003³⁷, the partnership with NFPs is much better than it was at the beginning of the campaign one year before.**

However, some problems remain: a number of NFPs are still not convinced by the campaign and are not willing in participating with it at all, while some others remain critical even though working with it.

It appears therefore worthwhile to identify those factors contributing to these various levels of partnership and involvement of NFPs in the campaign. This analysis enables us to identify potential synergies to increase cooperation and enhance the effect of the campaign in each Member State.

³⁷ Date of most of these interviews.

7.3 Nature of current partnership

The level of co-operation with various partners is still quite diverse. Our research enables us to define groups of countries according to their interest, stake, resources and constraints and finally willingness to co-operate (see below). In these results, national contexts are a determining factor.

When partnership occurs, it also takes different forms and degrees, according to the resources and constraints of each NFP.

However, one common task often requested from the NFPs is to validate, advise upon, and/or to revise campaign materials as necessary. Thus, Media Consulta uses NFPs to get their advice on relevant translations, claims, and sometimes on national media (e.g. in Italy).

- ❖ This is important for NFPs who are wary of negative potential impacts that poor translations or improper communication strategies might have on teenagers.
- ❖ However, some NFPs indicate they feel that they are being asked to do this often quite extensive work at no cost, and they are doing these tasks reluctantly.
- ❖ Most NFPs also point out that they are sometimes unable to do this work because they are asked too late.

Another role as a national focal point is to inform ministries about the campaign. Usually, NFPs say that ministries pay only weak attention to the European campaign, as long as they are not personally contacted by the Commission and involved with clear roles.

For those NFPs that cooperate the most, cooperation may include different activities: organising media coverage of events such as the Truck Tour; contacting schools to involve classes and teenagers; city councils to identify suitable venues for events; the media to provide publicity; politicians to create a political awareness around the tobacco issue; other local events given European leaflets, advertising boards and campaign material to distribute...

7.4 Causes and conditions of partnership

A prerequisite for co-operation is **information**, and to the extent that we could observe, the degree of collaboration with the campaign in each Member State is directly dependent upon this.

- Most NFPs claim to know the campaign well, with some differences depending upon the degree of their collaboration with Media Consulta. The least informed NFPs are those that did not take part in the meetings in Luxembourg, although other meetings (ENSP, etc.) gave opportunities to Media Consulta to present the campaign.
- Members of the Expert Panel are the ones who are the best informed.
- Government Ministries seem to be unaware of the campaign, except for some minor bits and pieces here and there, sent to them by NFPs in a few cases. They do not know which unit at the Commission is responsible for the campaign. Their knowledge, and hence co-operation is thus non-existent or at the lowest possible level.

Beyond this preliminary information, other factors may explain the level of co-operation of each NFP. We distinguish below:

- Factors related to national context, which include:
 - ❖ national factors of reluctance towards the campaign mainly present in North European countries (United Kingdom and Ireland, Scandinavia, Netherlands);
 - ❖ factors of support of the campaign, mainly present in South European countries or German-speaking countries.
- Opinions related to the media campaign (content, style, communication channel ...).

7.4.1 Factors related to national contexts of Member States

National factors explaining lack of participation in the campaign

The countries most reluctant (in 2002!) to participate share several characteristics:

- An long-standing anti-tobacco policy, often influenced by the experience of non-European English-speaking countries³⁸, and funded with significant budgets compared to the other Member States. These countries also have a rather advanced tobacco prevention policy, especially through legislative instruments, as in Finland.
- Repeated experience of prevention campaigns, using various messages, including messages similar to MC's 2002 ones, using pop stars or sportsmen as models for young people.

E.g. in the United Kingdom, the campaign Stinx, released approximately two years ago, included a group of musicians providing their views on tobacco use. According to "ASH Scotland", the campaign appealed to the young who even made calls in order to buy the group's CD.

³⁸ Mainly the United States, Canada and Australia.

Some countries with this background, conscious of their specificity and their **national assets in the field**, are not especially interested in taking part in a European policy that they feel may result in reducing their advance, rather than in enhancing their current practices.

Other countries also stress their national specificity (e.g. translation of the messages of the campaign, co-ordination with national institutions and the most frequently used channels of communication, etc), but, due to the lack of financial means at the national level, welcome cooperation perspectives with regard to a European policy.

National factors of support to the campaign

- NFPs based in countries with **weak national anti-tobacco policies** tend to support a European-based media initiative. In this context and insofar as NFPs are committed to tobacco prevention, the European initiative is likely to be well accepted. Greece is an example, as well as Germany, Austria, Portugal, Italy.

Greece is an interesting example, as it is probably one of the least advanced Member States in the field. According to the Division of Prevention at the Ministry for Health, its budget for the general prevention/promotion of health (sports, nutrition, AIDS, tobacco) is € 1 Mn in 2003, and its only recent action in the field is a booklet explaining the consequences of tobacco on health. In the same way, the legislation improvements just seem to follow the initiatives from WHO or the European directives.

The Conselho de Prevenção do Tabagismo in Portugal does not have its own website. The www.feel-free.info/portugal.html website is therefore quite appreciated and regarded as a good opportunity for more cooperation.

- Even in the most advanced Member States, a European media action in the field is considered by NFPs as a potential **pressure on their government** to take more action with respect to tobacco use. From the NFP's point of view, the campaign target group in this case is then less the youth, and rather the politicians and national decision makers. If this perhaps comes across a bit cynically in some North European countries (i.e. in contrast to the explicit objective of the campaign), it is expressed more enthusiastically and openly in the least advanced countries.

In all cases, being a partner of the EU gives NFPs additional visibility and legitimacy with regard to their own ministries. **It is even the main benefit they get from participating in the campaign**, aside from their potential interest in contributing to a good cause (and given that NFPs do not receive specific financial back-up from the Commission for their support to the campaign).

- A basic reason for the participation of NFPs, including in the most advanced countries, can be the desire to avoid inconsistencies with other national messages.

For example, ASH Scotland would like to involve Health Education of Scotland in communicating a coherent message: a drug campaign also used the term "saying no" which could present some confusion between messages.

7.4.2 NFPs opinions about the campaign

- **The relationship between NFPs' opinions, and their position towards the campaign.**

The interest and willingness of NFPs in contributing to the campaign is better explained by contextual factors (financial resources or constraints, a favourable political culture marked by legislative headway, the legitimacy of the actors, previous experience ...) than by their opinions about the campaign.

However, opinions about the campaign influence more the willingness to contribute to it in those countries that have more resources to devote to tobacco control, than in other countries with weaker resources:

- ❖ Countries with bigger budget can afford to be more selective simply because different options of tobacco prevention campaigns do exist.
- ❖ They also have other experiences of campaigns which naturally make them more selective.

Consequently, opinions about the campaign quality are a cooperation factor mainly among NFPs coming from countries in the northern part of Europe.

- **Countries generally fall into two groups with respect to how appropriate the focal points view the campaign regarding their own country and tobacco campaign experience.** Ireland, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Netherlands and also France (INPES), even Spain, seem more critical than Portugal, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Greece, Austria, Germany. However the categorisation of countries is not always so clear cut, as, within a same country, several organisations may have different opinions, as in France.

Positive and critical comments expressed by the NFPs about the campaign, including its message and communication channels, are exposed below.

Altogether, favourable PFNs hardly express as many comments as critical ones. The length of the following paragraphs is therefore not representative of the numbers of supporting or critical comments. Also, the points presented below do not necessarily represent the views of the evaluators. This list, along with sample quotations, is presented in order to assist in understanding the viewpoints of the NFPs.

Some Pros according to NFPs:

- The youthful style is very appreciated and appears suitable.
- The use of role models for the young people is effective.
- The music is a good medium to get a message across: all young people listen to music.
- The colours are attractive.
- MTV fits with the target audience:

The idea of MTV is brilliant – kids really do watch it, spend their time like this...

Some Cons identified by NFPs:

- An homogeneous campaign which does not take into account national differences, or ignores relevant national experience:

Feel free – doesn't work in Scotland because of the drug campaign using the claim " just say no " - this campaign didn't work well in Scotland.

It's hard to imagine that the same size will fit all countries, given the diversity of anti-smoking activities across EU countries. It should not have the same ad everywhere: Not even Coke does this.

The EU could be like the WHO and try to come up with a central idea, that each country can then develop on its own.

- Radio is not used despite its performance in reaching teenagers. Some NFPs point to this as the weak point in Media Consulta's strategy of integrated communication.

The readership of the magazines for teenagers is ridiculous in our country. The teenagers do not read them. They listen to the radio. This channel should be given priority.

- The targeting is overly broad (the campaign actually aims only at 10-14 years old) or too narrow (only young people and not adults):

There should be lots of different targets, boys and girls, different age groups. We can't just have one campaign. Smoking cessation is different for young people, it is better not to start, thus the EU should aim at adults as well. But it's true that given limited resources, it is best to focus on young adolescents, to get them to stop or at least to delay the onset of smoking.

There is a need for something focusing on society rather than just at the youth, this unfairly is placing the emphasis on youth. One needs to concentrate on the social/cultural/political/ etc. environment, rather than just putting all the bonus on youth to change what they do. There is a need to move away from a focus on the individual to the setting, e.g. bars where smoking takes place.

- The slogan is too weak.

There is too much emphasis on the "feel free" vs. saying no. It goes in the right direction, but it should be more aggressive, say more regarding "the enemy". We learned from Florida that youth need a target. It should focus on making smoking less popular, rather than not smoking is cool. It should still talk about the Enemy: the tobacco industry.

- The kind of message:

I don't think having pop stars saying no to smoking would be credible, given how many of them smoke on their videos. We can't beat the tobacco industry at their own game. Instead it should be like Massachusetts, which had the coroner³⁹ showing dangerous substances and portraying tobacco as bad. It should expose the lies of the tobacco industry, the facts, dangers of passive smoking.

Ads aimed at teens is not a good idea, they'll dismiss this as patronising.

³⁹ Law officer, in charge of investigations related to violent, sudden or suspect deaths.

7.5 How to develop co-operation?

Co-operation can be developed at three levels:

- 1) **With national or regional ministries.** Many of the national focal points are not powerful enough to significantly influence government policies in their own countries. Others would like a greater coherence with existing national or regional campaigns. In all cases, all focal points would like the Commission to get more involved with national ministries.
- 2) **Between the European campaign and the actions of the NFPs, for more effective local contacts and for a more global policy.** The current campaign already integrates national elements while transmitting or linking national information, e.g. on the feel-free.info Web site, in the booklets, and through the "truck tour". Other actions are mentioned by the NFPs:

Schools are an excellent setting to reach youth – the EU should support school-based anti-smoking activities. He noted that education is on the agenda of every country. The EU should provide for training of people in the field, for everyone in contact with youth, e.g.: Teachers, Club leaders, Parent groups.

*We will be doing a baseline **survey** in July with a population of 3500 young people (age 12-19), in order to eventually identify the impact of our campaign, including awareness of the risk. We could ask about awareness of the "Feel Free" campaign.*

However this action could present difficulties in some countries, such as those with many anti-tobacco NGOs that are engaged in their own specific activities and where co-operation among them is sometimes uneasy:

We were suggesting to add something national to this pan-European campaigns (like local help line, etc) but it wouldn't work – there were too many fights among them: to do that, it would require a lot of cooperation between all and that was clearly impossible.

- 3) **Between the various countries (NGO, Member States) by disseminating knowledge on what works and does not work.**

EU should provide learning about what worked or not. E.g. distribute evaluation information about what works or not, so that one can learn from the experiences in other countries. The EU could organise regional/national conferences – to bring other NGOs together – to help the focal points and NGOs to communicate better.

There is a need for more data regarding smoking prevention and trends, a comprehensive overview of what is going on.

Methods recommended to develop a global cooperation are well-known (ability to listen to and to respect, capacity to take into account diverging views within the framework of evidence based negotiation, etc.). More importantly, however, implementation of these methods should be adapted to the countries' local situation: a NFP in a country with a strong and advanced tobacco epidemics prevention policy will expect to be more actively involved in the conception and/or ratification of the strategy.

7.6 Some advice from the NFPs to the European Commission on the management of future campaigns

- 1) Reassurance about the existence of a European campaign after the current three-year contract with Media Consulta. This action is a necessary condition for the NFPS to agree to invest time and resources with respect to European anti-smoking activities. Organising and creating the necessary expertise takes time. The majority of the national focal points currently are sceptical upon this point.
- 2) Significant increase in the campaign's budget in order to intensify it. All NFPS identify this as an essential requirement for the campaign to be able to be effective.
 - In particular, with the entry of the 10 new Member States, EU funding and support will be essential for them to be involved at all in this field.
- 3) Get closer to the national ministries (or to regional authorities⁴⁰) for greater efficiency and for overall coherence.
- 4) Facilitate knowledge dissemination about the effectiveness of anti-tobacco media campaign (the majority of research on the subject is coming from the United States).
- 5) In the larger context of a comprehensive European policy regarding tobacco:
 - ❖ Stop subsidising tobacco production.
 - ❖ Moving ahead with new legal measures, e.g. a directive on non-smoking areas.

⁴⁰ Example of Spain: opportunity to get free additional broadcast on the Spanish public television.

7.7 List of consulted or interviewed persons

- Austria, Prof. Dr Manfred Neuberger, University of Vienna, Departement of preventive medicine.
- Austria, Dr Kurt Aigner, Krankenhaus des Elisabethinen.
- Belgium, Marleen Lambert, Vlaams Instituut voor Gezondheidpromotie (VIG).
- Denmark, Joergen Falk, National Board of Health & ENYPAT
- European Network for Smoking Prevention (ENSP), Sophie Kazan, Director, Strategy and Communications
- Finland, Pr. Erkki Vartiainen, KTL - National Public Health Institute
- Finlande, Ms Satu Lipponen, Finish Cancer Society, Head of Information
- France, M. Alexandre Picard, Institut National de Prévention et d'Education pour la Santé (INPES).
- Germany, Dr Reiner Hanewinkel, IFT (Institut für Therapie und Gesundheitsforschung. Focal Point for Germany
- Germany, Friedrich Wiebel, Focal Point for Germany
- Germany, Peter Lang, Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung (federal Ministry of Health, GERMANY). Also ENHPA's representative to the Panel of Experts.
- Germany, Dr. Renate Bergmann, Charite-Wirschow Klinik.
- Greece, Thanos Zavras, National School of Public Health
- Greece, Dr. Maroulis Lekka, Ministry of Health, Department of Public Health
- Greece, Dr Sapounas Th., Ministry of Health, Head of the Department of Public Health.
- Greece, Thalia Minakouli, Ministry of Health, Division of Prevention and Health Education.
- Greece, Mme Soku, coordinating the Network of Health-Promoting Schools.
- Holland, Renate Spruijt, Stivoro
- Ireland, Ms Valerie Coghlan, ASH Ireland
- Ireland, Mrs Norma Cronin, Irish Cancer Society
- Italy, Dr Mangiaracina, GEA
- Italy, Pia Elliott, independent media consultant
- Luxembourg, Renée Lambert, Fondation Luxembourgeoise contre le cancer
- Portugal, Ruis Lopes, Conselho Prevencao do Tabagismo
- Portugal, Casimiro Balsa, Université Lisbonne
- Spain, Javier Toledo Pallerés, Servicio Aragonés de Salud, Focal Point for SPAIN



- Spain, Juan-Ramon Villalbi, ENSP, Panel of Experts, Institut Municipal de Salut Publica (IMSP) (Barcelona, Department of Public Health)
- United Kingdom, Maureen Moore, ASH Scotland
- United Kingdom, Doreen McIntyre, No Smoking Day
- United Kingdom, Amanda Amos, University of Edinburg
- Sweden, Ann-Therese Enarsson, Rökfri generation (smoke-free generation)
- Sweden, Ms Margaretha Haglund, National Institute of Public Health (under the ministry of health)
- WHO, Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva, WHO Tobacco Free Initiative (Genève)
- WHO, Chitra Subramaniam-Duella, Coordinator, Policy Analysis and Communications, Tobacco Free Initiative (Genève)